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This Article considers the distributional consequences of the Supreme Court’s fed-
eralism jurisprudence over the past quarter century, focusing specifically on the
anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines. The
first of these doctrines prevents Congress from compelling the states to administer
federal programs; the second prevents Congress from achieving the same result
through offers that for practical purposes the states cannot refuse; the third pro-
hibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity outside a limited class of
cases. These doctrines vest the states with valuable entitlements and allow the states
to sell those entitlements back to Congress for a price. In this respect, the doctrines
have an intergovernmental distributional effect, shifting wealth from the federal
government to the states.
The distributional consequences of the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and
state sovereign immunity doctrines are not purely intergovernmental, however. The
doctrines also have potential implications for the distribution of wealth across indi-
viduals and households. By forcing Congress to bear a larger share of the costs of
federal programs, and by shifting some of the costs of liability-imposing statutes
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2 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1
from the states to Congress, these doctrines allow the states to raise less revenue and
compel Congress to raise more. For a number of historical as well as structural
reasons, the federal tax system is dramatically more progressive than even the most
progressive state tax systems, and so the reallocation of fiscal responsibility
resulting from these federalism doctrines causes more revenue raising to occur via
the more progressive system. The likely net effect is a shift in wealth from higher-
income households (who bear a larger share of the federal tax burden) to lower-
and middle-income households (who would have borne a larger share of the
burden of state taxes).
This conclusion comes with a number of caveats. The distributional consequences
of the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines may be moderated—or magnified—by
differences in federal and state spending priorities. Moreover, the doctrines may
affect the size of government as well as the allocation of fiscal responsibility across
levels of government (though the net effect on government size is ambiguous). And
the doctrines may have distributional consequences that are not only interpersonal,
but also intergenerational. What seems clear from the analysis in this Article is that
federalism doctrines affect the distribution of income and wealth in subtle and
sometimes unexpected ways, and that a comprehensive understanding of wealth
inequality in the United States requires careful attention to key features of our fiscal
constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
The anti-commandeering doctrine and its close cousin, the anti-
coercion rule, have taken on new life in the age of Trump. The first of
these, the anti-commandeering doctrine, holds that the federal gov-
ernment cannot compel states to pass particular laws or implement
particular programs. While the anti-commandeering doctrine still
allows the federal government to pay the states to carry out federal
policies, the anti-coercion rule places a limit on that power: “[T]he
financial inducement offered by Congress” cannot be “so coercive as
to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”1 Both of
these doctrines historically have had a particular ideological valence:
Noah Feldman describes them as doctrines “developed by conserva-
tive justices to thwart progressive results.”2 But with Donald Trump in
the White House, progressives have begun to recognize that the anti-
commandeering and anti-coercion doctrines may protect blue state
policies from presidential attack.3
Or so goes the conventional wisdom among commentators
writing in the wake of Trump’s November 2016 electoral victory. And
for the most part, the conventional wisdom goes unchallenged here. It
is true that the anti-commandeering rule was crystallized in the case of
Printz v. United States,4 where it was used to strike down provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state and
1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012)  (quoting South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)).
2 Noah Feldman, Sanctuary Cities Are Safe, Thanks to Conservatives, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Nov. 29, 2016, 2:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-29/
sanctuary-cities-are-safe-thanks-to-conservatives.
3 See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 191840, at *50–54 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017) (permanently enjoining portion of
executive order instructing Attorney General to withhold certain federal grants from
“sanctuary jurisdictions” on grounds that the order “violates the Tenth Amendment’s
prohibitions against commandeering”); City of Phila. v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188954, at *171 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017) (recognizing that the Attorney
General’s policy “implicate[s] the Tenth Amendment and its built-in anti-commandeering
principle” but granting a preliminary injunction on other grounds).
4 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 4 Side B      04/02/2018   14:13:19
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 4 Side B      04/02/2018   14:13:19
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-APR-18 13:29
4 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1
local law enforcement officers to run background checks on prospec-
tive handgun purchasers. It is also true that Printz was a 5-4 decision
pitting the Court’s more conservative members against its more liberal
faction, with Justice Scalia writing the majority opinion.5 The anti-
commandeering doctrine is now being wielded as a shield by oppo-
nents of President Trump’s bid to withhold federal funds from state
and local governments that decline to cooperate with federal efforts to
deport undocumented immigrants.6 And so it is quite reasonable to
conclude that “Antonin Scalia might have saved sanctuary cities.”7
Likewise, it is true that the anti-coercion rule was first invoked to
invalidate federal legislation in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), the 2012 case in which the Supreme
Court upheld some elements of the Affordable Care Act and struck
down others.8 Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB
concluded that Congress could not require states receiving federal
Medicaid funding to extend coverage to adults with incomes below
133% of the poverty level: The “financial ‘inducement’” offered by
the Affordable Care Act—expand coverage or else lose all Medicaid
funding—was, according to Chief Justice Roberts, “a gun to the
head.”9 The effect of that holding was to block an important element
of President Obama’s signature legislative achievement: Ultimately,
nineteen states would opt out of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion after NFIB.10 And while this part of the Chief Justice’s
opinion was joined by two Democratic appointees, Justices Stephen
Breyer and Elena Kagan, their votes were branded as “defections”
from the liberal camp.11 Now, however, the same anti-coercion rule
5 Id. at 900, 939.
6 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary Cities Is
Unconstitutional , WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 26, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/constitutional-problems-
with-trumps-executive-order-on-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.ded911f57192 (arguing that
President Trump’s executive order denying federal funding to sanctuary cities
“commandeers” the states).
7 Eric Levitz, Antonin Scalia Might Have Saved Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 29, 2016, 2:23 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/
antonin-scalia-might-have-saved-sanctuary-cities.html.
8 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
9 Id. at 2604.
10 See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2017), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-
around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act (tracking states’ decisions
about adopting the Medicaid expansion).
11 See Dahlia Lithwick, Where Is the Liberal Outrage?, SLATE (July 6, 2012, 4:38 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/while_conserva
tives_are_furious_about_john_roberts_health_care_decision_liberals_are_silent_about_
the_defections_from_the_supreme_court_s_liberal_justices_.html (noting that liberals
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 5 Side A      04/02/2018   14:13:19
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 5 Side A      04/02/2018   14:13:19
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 5  2-APR-18 13:29
April 2018] FEDERALISM AS A SAFEGUARD 5
stands in President Trump’s way as he tries to deny federal funds to
sanctuary cities. As Professor Feldman puts it: “Behold the revenge of
conservative federalism: Judge-made doctrines developed to protect
states’ rights against progressive legislation can also be used to protect
cities against Trump’s conservative policies. Ain’t constitutional law
grand?”12
Yet even before President Trump came to power, the “conserva-
tive federalism” doctrines to which Feldman refers may have been
advancing progressive objectives in more subtle ways. This Article
argues that the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion doctrines,
along with the state sovereign immunity doctrine, play an under-
appreciated role as safeguards of progressive taxation. The “revenge
of conservative federalism,” I suggest, was raging from the start, long
before Donald Trump was in the White House or even on reality
television.
Such a claim may seem surprising at first blush: After all, feder-
alism generally entails a shift of power toward the states, and state-
level taxation is (as discussed in more detail below) significantly less
progressive than federal taxation. And like most first impressions, this
first impression is half-right: State-level taxation is indeed much less
progressive than federal taxation. But the effect of federalism doc-
trines (and specifically, the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and
state sovereign immunity doctrines) is not to increase our reliance on
relatively regressive state-level taxes. Quite the opposite: Federalism
doctrines, this Article argues, shift revenue raising toward the more
progressive federal system.
The argument proceeds as follows: I begin by highlighting the
stark contrast between the ways that Congress and the states structure
their tax systems. Effective federal tax rates rise steadily over the
income distribution. The opposite is true at the state level: State taxes
(and taxes imposed by local governments, which are instrumentalities
of the state) are generally flat or regressive over the income distribu-
tion in effective-rate terms. This contrast can be attributed to a
number of factors: the fear that a state’s richest residents will leave if
the state imposes highly progressive taxes; the corollary fear that low-
income individuals and families will flow in if a state adopts too gen-
erous a redistributive scheme; and the constraint imposed by state
constitutions that place limits on progressive income taxation. The gap
between the federal and state systems is so wide that even the most
overlook Justices Stephen Breyer’s and Elena Kagan’s defection from the liberal camp in
the Medicaid expansion part of the Affordable Care Act cases).
12 See Feldman, supra note 2.
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progressive state tax systems are significantly less progressive than
their federal counterpart.
I then go on to explain how the Supreme Court’s federalism deci-
sions—particularly in the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and sov-
ereign immunity contexts—vest the states with valuable entitlements
protected by a “property rule” (to borrow a phrase popularized by
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed).13 “An entitlement is
protected by a property rule,” according to Calabresi and Melamed,
“to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement
from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”14 In
the anti-commandeering and anti-coercion contexts, the relevant enti-
tlement is the states’ control over their own legislative processes and
administrative capabilities. In the sovereign immunity context, the rel-
evant entitlement is the states’ control over whether they can be sued
by private citizens. There are, to be sure, limits on the latter entitle-
ment: Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to
the Reconstruction Amendments in certain contexts,15 and can also
do so pursuant to the Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause.16 Yet in the
mine-run of cases, the states—not Congress—get to decide whether
states can be sued by private citizens in state and federal court.
Importantly, the entitlements allocated to the states by federalism
doctrines are tradeable entitlements: The states can sell these entitle-
ments to Congress, though Congress cannot seize the entitlements
outside of a voluntary exchange. (This is what it means for the entitle-
ment to be protected by a property rule rather than a liability rule or
an inalienability rule.) And as Aziz Huq observes, these federalism
doctrines “leave open the possibility that states can engage in mutu-
ally beneficial trading with Congress.”17 When members of Congress
believe that the benefits of having the states enact or administer a
particular program are greater than the costs to the states of enacting
or administering the program, Congress can purchase the states’ enti-
13 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
14 Id.
15 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (“[T]hrough the
Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extend[s] to intrude upon the province of the
Eleventh Amendment and therefore . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow[s]
Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment.”).
16 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378 (2006) (“In ratifying the
Bankruptcy Clause, the States acquiesced in a subordination of whatever sovereign
immunity they might otherwise have asserted in proceedings necessary to effectuate the in
rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.”).
17 Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1635
(2014).
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tlement for a price. Such exchanges are indeed quite common, with
Congress effectively hiring the states to administer Medicaid, the
SNAP/Food Stamp Program, and the Federal-State Unemployment
Insurance Program (among countless others), and effectively paying
the states to enact measures such as a minimum legal drinking age of
21.18 Likewise, when members of Congress believe that the benefits of
having the states waive sovereign immunity in a particular context are
greater than the costs to the states of liability, Congress can effectively
buy such waivers.19 The anti-coercion principle acts as something of
an “unconscionability doctrine” regulating such exchanges—the bar-
gain’s terms cannot be too lopsided on terms.20 But for the most part,
tradability is the norm and judicial intervention the exception.
Yet the possibility of bargaining between Congress and the states
does not make the initial allocation of entitlements irrelevant. By
assigning valuable entitlements to the states rather than the federal
government, these federalism doctrines generate potentially signifi-
cant distributive effects. Per the Coase Theorem, whether a court
assigns the property right over a particular plot to the farmer or the
rancher will not—in the absence of transaction costs—affect whether
the farmer plants crops or the cattle-raiser allows his cows to graze on
the plot; the court’s allocation of the entitlement will, however, affect
whether the farmer pays the rancher or vice versa.21 So too in the
18 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987) (holding Congress can use its
spending power to encourage states to impose a minimum drinking age of 21).
19 See Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2005)
(holding that acceptance of federal funds waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for
Louisiana Tech University under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Litman v. George
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that George Mason University’s
receipt of Title IX funds indicated an unambiguous waiver of the university’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
20 See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 205 (2000) (“The unconscionability doctrine in
contract law enables a court to decline to enforce a contract whose terms are seriously one-
sided, overreaching, exploitative, or otherwise manifestly unfair.”). Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion in NFIB explicitly appeals to contract law principles and accuses Congress of
contractual overreach. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602
(2012) (“The legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power . . . ‘rests on whether
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.”’” (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 2 (1981))); see also id. at 2606–07
(concluding that the Medicaid provisions in the Affordable Care Act cross the line “where
persuasion gives way to coercion”). For a trenchant critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s
contract law analogy, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid
Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283,
1297–1301 (2013).
21 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (“It is
always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of
rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of
rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”).
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8 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1
intergovernmental context: The initial allocation of entitlements
between Congress and the states will not necessarily determine who
administers federal programs or whether states can be sued by private
citizens. The allocation of entitlements will, however, very much affect
the direction of the intergovernmental flow of funds, even if states and
the federal government can engage in mutually beneficial trading ex
post.
More precisely, the allocation of entitlements to states rather
than to Congress enriches the states relative to the federal govern-
ment: The states can sell their entitlements when they want to and
never have to buy them. In this respect, federalism doctrines yield an
intergovernmental distributive effect much like the interpersonal dis-
tributive effect in Coase’s classic example.22 The anti-commandeering
doctrine does not necessarily mean that states will stop administering
federal programs, nor does the state sovereign immunity doctrine
mean that states will no longer be subject to suit by private citizens.
These doctrines do mean, though, that the states need not relinquish
these entitlements unless they get paid (and, per the anti-coercion
rule, the bargain must not be a holdup).
But why should the intergovernmental distributional conse-
quences of the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines affect the inter-
personal distribution of wealth? Here, the contrast between federal-
level progressivity and state-level regressivity returns to the analysis.
The allocation of valuable entitlements to the states rather than the
federal government allows the states to tax less and forces the federal
government to tax more. And so to a first approximation, federalism
doctrines that allocate valuable entitlements to the states cause more
revenue raising to occur through the more progressive federal tax
system, with the consequence that the rich pay a larger share of the
revenues raised than they would if the revenue had been raised via
less progressive state tax systems.
This claim must be accompanied by a number of qualifications.
First, the progressivity of the federal and state tax systems may
depend in part on the amount of revenue raising that occurs through
federal and state channels. Second, redistribution of resources across
levels of government may alter the composition of federal and state
22 See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 671 n.8 (1979) (noting that “[t]he recognition that
distribution would be affected has been made more explicit in articles, in the Coase
Theorem tradition, that have come out since the original statement”). But cf. George J.
Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 99 YALE L.J. 631, 633 (1989) (noting that under
certain circumstances, the distributional effects of an initial allocation of entitlements are
only temporary).
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spending in ways that affect the interpersonal distribution of wealth.
Third, the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign
immunity doctrines may affect not only the allocation of revenue
raising responsibilities but also the overall size of government (though
the direction of the effect is, as discussed below, theoretically and
empirically ambiguous). Fourth, the distribution of revenue raising
responsibilities across levels of government may also affect the
distribution of revenue raising burdens across generations, as the fed-
eral government generally has greater leeway to finance current
spending through debt (and thus to shift the burden of revenue raising
to future taxpayers). Fifth, and finally, the federalism doctrines upon
which this Article focuses may operate alongside the “political safe-
guards of federalism” to which this Article’s title alludes.23 These
qualifications are all explained and explored in greater detail below.
Ultimately, however, none of these qualifications should lead us to
reject the top-line conclusion that federalism’s allocation of valuable
entitlements to state governments pushes in a progressive distribu-
tional direction.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides rele-
vant background on redistribution at the federal and state level. It
explains why state and local governments are widely thought to be less
capable than the federal government when it comes to shifting wealth
from the rich to the poor. Part II introduces the anti-commandeering,
anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines, and explains
how these doctrines allocate entitlements across levels of government.
Part III presents a rudimentary model of federal and state taxing and
spending, and shows how reallocations of valuable entitlements across
levels of government may affect individual tax burdens. Part IV con-
siders complications and qualifications, including the effect of feder-
alism doctrines on the structure of state and federal tax systems, the
composition of spending, the overall size of government, and the allo-
cation of fiscal burdens across generations. Part IV also discusses the
relationship between federalism’s judicial and political safeguards.
The Article concludes by situating the present analysis within broader
debates about inequalities of income and wealth.
23 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
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10 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1
I
REDISTRIBUTION AT THE FEDERAL AND STATE LEVEL
Despite news stories about billionaires paying nothing in federal
income taxes24 (or paying a lower effective rate than their secre-
taries25), the fact of the matter is that the federal tax system is steeply
progressive. By virtually any measure, effective federal tax rates (i.e.,
taxes as a percentage of income) rise over the income distribution,
with the rich paying more than the poor. The opposite is true at the
state level: By virtually any measure, effective state and local tax rates
decline over the income distribution, with the poor paying higher rates
than the rich. Part I.A illustrates the stark contrast between federal-
level progressivity and state-level regressivity. Parts I.B and I.C dis-
cuss structural and institutional explanations for the divergence.
A. Data
Figure 1 compares effective federal and state tax rates across the
income distribution. I rely on two sources for estimates of effective
federal rates: the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center’s Microsimula-
tion Model26 and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy
(ITEP) Tax Model.27 Figure 1 also shows the Urban-Brookings Tax
Policy Center’s projection of effective federal tax rates across the
income distribution under the version of H.R. 1, the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act, which was ordered reported by the House Committee on
24 See Steve Eder & Megan Twohey, Donald Trump Acknowledges Not Paying Federal
Income Taxes for Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/
us/politics/donald-trump-taxes.html.
25 See Chris Isidore, Buffett Says He’s Still Paying Lower Tax Rate than His Secretary,
CNN MONEY (Mar. 4, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/04/news/economy/
buffett-secretary-taxes.
26 URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., TABLE T17-0003: BASELINE DISTRIBUTION
OF INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES BY EXPANDED CASH INCOME PERCENTILE (2017), http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/file/156436/download?token=J05ROhhf.
27 INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, Who Pays Taxes in America in 2017? (2017),
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/taxday2017.pdf.
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Ways and Means in November 2017,28 as well as ITEP’s estimate of
effective state tax rates across the income distribution.29
FIGURE 1. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AT FEDERAL AND STATE LEVELS
BY INCOME GROUP (2017 LAW AND TAX CUTS
AND JOBS ACT)30
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An important caveat is that any calculation of effective tax rates
requires a number of debatable assumptions about the distribution of
tax burdens across households.31 However, the basic contrast between
28 URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX
CUTS AND JOBS ACT AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE 3 tbl.1
(2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/distributional-analysis-tax-cuts-and-
jobs-act-passed-house-ways-and-means-committee/full. The bill became law in December
2017, though it lost its given name because the Senate Parliamentarian deemed the title
provision to violate the upper chamber’s “Byrd Rule.” See An Act To Provide for
Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for
Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); see also Ellen P. Aprill &
Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2, 28–29), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3116973
(discussing the Byrd Rule challenge to the bill’s short title).
29 INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, supra note 27. Unfortunately, the Urban-
Brookings model does not include a state tax component, and ITEP has not produced its
own projection of the Trump plan.
30 See supra text accompanying notes 26–29.
31 The difficulty arises from the fact that who pays a tax and who bears the burden of
the tax are not necessarily the same. For example, the federal government imposes a 15.3%
payroll tax, with half the tax (7.65%) technically paid by employers and the other half
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federal and state effective rates remains robust to a number of alter-
native specifications.32 The fact that the federal tax system is
significantly more progressive than all state tax systems cannot be
seriously disputed. Indeed, the difference between federal and state
rates is so stark that even under the tax plan proposed by the Trump
Administration and congressional Republican leaders in September
2017 and enacted in modified form three months later—a plan widely
criticized as a giveaway to the wealthy33—the federal system remains
significantly more progressive than its state counterparts.
Concededly, the comparison between the progressivity of the fed-
eral system and the regressivity of state systems masks the consider-
able variation across different states. The state ranked by ITEP as the
most regressive, Washington, has effective rates that decline sharply
across the income distribution, with the bottom quintile paying an
effective rate of 16.8% and the top percentile paying an effective rate
of only 2.8%. The state ranked by ITEP as the most progressive in
terms of its tax system, Delaware, has a roughly flat tax structure, with
families in the bottom quintile paying effective rates slightly lower
technically paid by employees. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY
BASICS: FEDERAL PAYROLL TAXES (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/10-17-12tax.pdf. There is little reason to believe, though, that the technical half-and-
half split has anything to do with the actual burden of the payroll tax. (Indeed, the general
view is that most or all of the burden of the payroll tax falls on labor, at least in the short
run. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll
Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 17 & n.47 (2002) (compiling sources).)
Determining the burden of the corporate income tax is even more challenging: Some
portion of the tax potentially falls on labor rather than shareholders, but no one knows
precisely how much. See Julie Anne Cronin et al., Distributing the Corporate Income Tax:
Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 239, 242 (2013).
32 For example, the Tax Foundation’s calculations would suggest that state and local tax
systems are slightly less regressive than the ITEP model indicates. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Malm, TAX FOUND., COMMENTS ON Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax
Systems in All 50 States 1 (Feb. 20, 2013), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/
ff361.pdf. But even under the Tax Foundation’s methodology, effective rates at the state
and local levels decline modestly as income increases, while effective rates at the federal
level rise sharply as income increases. See id. at 4 fig.3; TAX FOUND., FACTS & FIGURES:
HOW DOES YOUR STATE COMPARE? tbl.10 (2015), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/
docs/Fact%26Figures_15_web_9_2.pdf.
33 See, e.g., Heather Long, 9 Ways Trump’s Tax Plan Is a Gift to the Rich, Including
Himself, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2017/09/28/9-ways-trumps-tax-plan-is-a-gift-to-the-rich-including-himself;
Annie Lowrey, Trump Says His Tax Plan Won’t Benefit the Rich—He’s Exactly Wrong,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/09/trump-
tax-plan-benefit-rich/541584; Edward J. McCaffery, Trump’s Massive Tax Cut—For the
Rich, CNN (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/27/opinions/trump-tax-plan-
opinion-mccaffery/index.html.
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than families in the top percentile (5.5% versus 6.4%).34 Note that
even the most progressive state tax system is significantly less progres-
sive than the federal system—and the difference is so wide that this
fact is unlikely to change anytime soon.
FIGURE 2. EFFECTIVE STATE TAX RATES IN MOST AND LEAST
PROGRESSIVE STATES (2015)35
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Another way of illustrating the difference between the federal
and state tax systems is by focusing on the percentage of taxes paid by
each income group. In other words, for each $1 of tax revenues raised
at each level of government, what percentage comes from taxpayers in
the bottom quintile, what percentage from taxpayers in the next quin-
tile, and so on? Figure 3 shows these percentage shares using the
ITEP model. As Figure 3 illustrates, taxpayers in the bottom four
quintiles pay a larger share of state taxes than of federal taxes; tax-
payers in the top decile pay a larger share of federal taxes than of
state taxes; and taxpayers in the 80th to 90th percentiles pay approxi-
mately the same share of federal taxes as of state taxes.
34 INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 43, 123 (5th ed. 2015), https://itep.org/wp-content/
uploads/whopaysreport.pdf.
35 The data for Figure 2 are drawn from the Institution on Taxation and Economic
Policy’s distributional analysis of state tax systems. See id.
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FIGURE 3. SHARE OF FEDERAL AND STATE TAXES, BY INCOME
GROUP (2016)36
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Table 1 reproduces Figure 3 in textual format, with two additional
columns. The first additional column shows the difference between
the federal tax share and state tax share for each income group.
Shifting an additional $1 of revenue raised from the state systems to
the federal system will, all else equal, mean that families in the top
percentile pay an additional 7.9 cents in total taxes while families in
the bottom quintile pay 2.9 cents less in total taxes. Note that the fed-
eral government transferred approximately $686.303 billion to states
and their subdivisions in the fiscal year beginning in October 2016.37
The final column shows the change in after-tax income for each group
36 Figure 3 is derived from INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, supra note 27. The
percentages in text and in Figure 3 are “without federal offset,” i.e., they reflect taxes paid
to state and local governments, without an adjustment for the fact that state and local tax
payments generate a valuable federal income tax deduction for some taxpayers. Adding in
federal offsets makes the state systems appear to be even more regressive, because higher-
income taxpayers benefit disproportionately from itemized deductions. Note that the 2015
ITEP report only includes taxpayers under age 65. For an explanation of the reasons why
ITEP excludes older taxpayers, see id. at 19.
37 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 2018: HISTORICAL TABLES (Table 12.1—Summary
Comparison of Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments: 1940–2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/hist.pdf.
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that would occur if the $686.303 billion transferred from the federal
government to the states each year had been raised through state
taxes instead (holding constant the structure of the federal and state
tax systems). Such a shift would mean that families in the bottom
quintile would see their after-tax incomes decline by 4.2% of cash
income, while families in the top percentile would see their after-tax
incomes rise by 2.0% of cash income. On this view, the fact that $686
billion is raised through the federal tax systems rather than state tax
systems has a significant impact on the after-tax distribution of wealth
in the United States.
TABLE 1. DIFFERENCE IN FEDERAL AND STATE TAX SHARES38
Difference x
% Federal % State
Income Difference Transfer as
Taxes Taxes
Group (% Federal – % State) % of Cash
(2016) (2016)
Income
0%-20% 1.2% 4.1% -2.9% -4.2%
20%-40% 4.2% 7.8% -3.7% -2.6%
40%-60% 9.1% 12.1% -2.9% -1.2%
60%-80% 18.4% 19.8% -1.5% -0.4%
80%-90% 15.1% 14.9% +0.2% +0.0%
90%-95% 11.1% 10.4% +0.8% +0.3%
95%-99% 16.1% 14.0% +2.1% +0.6%
99%-100% 24.8% 16.8% +7.9% +2.0%
The story told by these figures and statistics is in one sense clear
and in another quite puzzling. It is clear that the federal tax system is
much more progressive than state tax systems, and that shifting
responsibility for revenue raising from the federal system to state sys-
tems would (holding all else equal) result in a significant regressive
redistribution of wealth. What is less clear is: Why do the same voters
choose federal-level lawmakers who implement progressive taxes and
state-level lawmakers who implement flat or regressive systems? Parts
I.B and I.C take up that question.
38 INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, supra note 27; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
FY 2018 HISTORICAL TABLES (Table 12.1), supra note 37 (stating transfer figure of $686.30
billion); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTION TABLE
2017 002: DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY SOURCE (2017 INCOME LEVELS) (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Distribution-
of-Income-by-Source-2017.pdf (stating family cash income) .
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 10 Side B      04/02/2018   14:13:19
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 10 Side B      04/02/2018   14:13:19
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 16  2-APR-18 13:29
16 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1
B. Federal Progressivity, State Regressivity: Structural Explanations
What accounts for the stark contrast between federal and state
tax systems? One important factor is the sales tax at the state level
(and the relative insignificance of sales taxes at the federal level).
States derive about a third of their revenue, on average, from sales
taxes,39 while federal excises and customs duties account for less than
5% of federal tax revenues.40 Sales and excise taxes scale over con-
sumption rather than income, and consumption is likely to be a larger
share of income for families lower on the income ladder (who are
likely to save less). Moreover, sales and excise taxes are generally flat
(although a progressive consumption tax is certainly conceivable).41
Yet the explanation in the previous paragraph is incomplete in
two respects. First, four states (Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire,
and Oregon) have no sales tax, and the tax systems of these states are
still regressive relative to the federal system.42 Second, and more fun-
damentally, the sales tax explanation simply restates the question. The
puzzle is why the federal tax system is so much more progressive than
state tax systems. It is no answer to say that the federal tax system is
more progressive because the federal government relies on progres-
sive taxes.
A potentially more persuasive explanation for the contrast
between federal and state tax systems is that the marginal cost of
redistribution is higher at the state level than at the federal level. This
proposition is a “classical theoretical result” of the literature on fiscal
federalism43—and an intuitive one at that. In a nutshell, states that
redistribute from the rich to the poor will see their richer residents
migrate elsewhere and poorer residents from other states flood in.
The outflow of wealthy individuals will mean that states with highly
progressive tax systems will see their tax bases shrink. The inflow of
low-income individuals will mean that states with generous redistribu-
tive policies will see the costs of social welfare programs rise.44
39 See INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, supra note 34, at 1.
40 See OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTION TABLE 2017 002, supra note 38.
41 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1575 (1979) (explaining how such a system might be designed).
42 See Jeremy Bowman, The 5 States with No Sales Tax, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 16, 2014,
2:14 PM), http://www.fool.com/personal-finance/taxes/2014/08/16/the-5-states-with-no-
sales-tax.aspx. Alaska has no state-level sales tax, but municipalities can (and many do)
impose a retail-level tax. See id.
43 John R. Brooks II, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of
Redistributive Taxation, 68 TAX L. REV. 89, 111 (2014).
44 The fiscal federalism literature on the relative costs of national-level and
subnational-level redistribution is extensive. For an overview, see id. at 89 n.1; Kirk J.
Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage
State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1408 & nn.71–73 (2004).
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Economists Martin Feldstein and Marian Vaillant Wrobel offer per-
haps the strongest version of the theory: They assert that “[s]tates and
other local governments cannot redistribute income if individuals can
migrate among political jurisdictions.”45
Of course, the same concern about redistribution resulting in the
outmigration of high-income individuals and the inflow of low-income
individuals applies to national-level redistribution as well, as the con-
cern about Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin’s renunciation of
his U.S. citizenship in 2012 serves to illustrate.46 But for an individual
or for a firm, it is almost always easier to move across state lines in
response to redistributive tax policies than to move across national
boundaries. And so we might expect that cost of redistribution—both
in terms of the negative effect on the tax base from an outflow of
high-income taxpayers and in terms of the increased burden on social
welfare programs due to an inflow of low-income individuals—will be
higher when redistribution is pursued at a lower level of government.
This argument gets us part of the way toward understanding the
puzzling contrast between federal and state tax systems—but not all
the way. The classical theoretical result of the fiscal federalism litera-
ture—that the mobility of high-income individuals and their capital
restricts the redistributive capacity of state and local governments47—
garners surprisingly equivocal empirical support. A comprehensive
review of the econometric literature on the wage and migration effects
of state-level taxation lies beyond the scope of this Article, but two
studies in particular merit mention. The first, by Andrew Leigh,
45 Martin Feldstein & Marian Vaillant Wrobel, Can State Taxes Redistribute Income?,
68 J. PUB. ECON. 369, 370 (1998) (emphasis added). This is not to say that state and local
governments never try to redistribute income. But according to Feldstein and Wrobel:
Although state tax structures may appear to be redistributive, real pretax
wages must adjust in the long run to make each individual’s after-tax real
income (or, more precisely, utility level) the same in all jurisdictions. If the
after-tax real income available to an individual were higher in one state than in
another, individuals would locate in states where real net incomes were more
favorable. In response to differences in the progressivity of tax rates, migration
would raise pretax real incomes of high income individuals in states where such
individuals were taxed more heavily and lower pretax incomes of lower income
individuals in such states. In equilibrium, the real after tax incomes would be
independent of the state tax structure.
Id.
46 See Laura Saunders, So How Much Did He Really Save?, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2012,
4:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303360504577410571011995562
(noting that Eduardo Saverin escaped tax liability following Facebook’s IPO by moving to
Singapore).
47 See Richard A. Musgrave, Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition, 11 J. ECON.
PERSP. 65, 67 (1997) (“Any jurisdiction which unilaterally imposes higher taxes at the
upper end of the scale invites the loss of mobile resources, including both capital and high-
income residents.”).
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examines taxes, wages, and migration across U.S. states between 1977
and 2002.48 Leigh finds that “more redistributive state taxes do not
appear to have a substantial impact on the composition or volume of
interstate migration.”49 More recently, Cristobal Young and collabo-
rators find that “millionaire migration is indeed responsive to top
income tax rates,” but “the magnitude of the migration response is
small and has little effect on the millionaire tax base.”50 Young and his
coauthors also find that the optimal state tax rate on millionaires from
a revenue maximization perspective is far above the actual rate in any
state,51 suggesting that the constraint imposed by millionaire migra-
tion cannot completely explain the relative regressivity of state tax
systems.52
Importantly, the tax changes that Leigh and Young et al. observe
are not applied at random: States self-select into taxation of the rich.
The states that do so may be the ones that expect high-income house-
holds to stay, and the states that did not adopt millionaire taxes may
have had a different experience if they did. For example, California
might have known that adopting a millionaire tax in 2005 would not
lead the studios in Hollywood to pack up or the high-tech companies
in Silicon Valley to flee, whereas a state such as Maryland might have
been more worried that a millionaire tax would cause high-income
households to cross the border to Virginia. The fact that relatively few
millionaires left California after its 2005 tax increase does not mean
that relatively few millionaires would have left Maryland if the same
tax had been applied there.53
An analogy to the private market serves to illustrate. Imagine
that we are trying to determine whether price increases affect demand
for meals served at restaurants. Imagine, moreover, that we observe
that restaurants do not experience a drop in sales volume after
adjusting their prices upward. Would these findings suggest that the
normal laws of supply and demand do not apply to restaurants? Not
necessarily. It could be that restaurants raise their prices after
48 Andrew Leigh, Do Redistributive State Taxes Reduce Inequality?, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 81
(2008).
49 Id. at 100.
50 Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite: Evidence
from Administrative Data, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 421, 423 (2016).
51 Id. at 434.
52 Young et al. explain these findings by positing that “[e]lites are embedded in the
regions where they achieve success,” and so “have limited interest in moving to procure tax
advantages.” Id. at 423.
53 On California’s passage of a surtax on incomes in excess of $1 million in the
November 2004 election, see Richard M. Scheffler & Neal Adams, Millionaires and Mental
Health: Proposition 63 in California , HEALTH AFF. (May 3, 2005), http://
content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/05/03/hlthaff.w5.212.full.pdf.
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receiving a Michelin star54: Sales might go up because of the Michelin
star, notwithstanding the price increase, but a comparable price
increase might well have led to lower demand at a restaurant that did
not receive the Michelin star. Analogously, California might raise its
taxes (i.e., its prices) when “demand for California” rises (e.g.,
because of tech sector growth). And yet we should not infer that the
laws of supply and demand do not apply to states just as they do to
restaurants.55
Recall also that cross-state mobility limits the efficacy of state-
level redistribution not just because the rich potentially will leave
high-tax states but also because the poor potentially will move to
states with more progressive tax-and-transfer systems. Here, the
empirical support for the predictions of fiscal federalism theory
appears to be stronger: Lower-income households are indeed more
likely to move to states with more generous welfare benefits.56 Yet as
above, endogeneity problems plague almost any effort to assess the
magnitude of the mobility responses to a further increase in state-level
redistribution. States may adopt more progressive tax and transfer
systems when they have reason to believe that low-income households
are less likely to move in (e.g., because of high real estate prices or
limited employment opportunities for low-wage workers), in which
case inferences based on enacted changes may cause us to underesti-
mate the effect of state-level progressivity on cross-state movement.57
To sum up so far: We have strong theoretical reasons to believe
that cross-state mobility limits the efficacy of state-level redistribution.
By contrast, cross-country mobility is much more limited, and so we
54 On Michelin stars and restaurant prices, see Olivier Gergaud, Karl Storchmann &
Vincenzo Verardi, Expert Opinion and Product Quality: Evidence from New York City
Restaurants, 53 ECON. INQUIRY 812 (2015).
55 Mobility effects can constrain state-level redistribution even if individuals do not
move across state lines. The possibility that high-income workers will leave high-tax states
may lead to an adjustment in wage rates: High-tax states must pay more to prevent high-
income workers from exiting. Likewise, the possibility that lower-income workers will
flock to states with generous redistributive schemes may lead to a wage rate adjustment in
the opposite direction: Firms in states with generous redistributive programs may pay low-
skilled workers less than firms in states with less generous programs pay to low-skilled
workers. See Feldstein & Wrobel, supra note 45, at 370. A rise in wage inequality could
thus undo the redistributive effects of state tax changes even if everyone remains in place.
Note, though, that Leigh finds “little evidence that—in aggregate—more redistributive
state taxes lead to a more unequal distribution of pre-tax hourly wages.” Leigh, supra note
48, at 100.
56 See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson & Mark Rom, American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and
Residential Choices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 725 (1989) (“State redistributive policies
are below  in part because low-income people are sensitive to interstate differences in
welfare policy.”).
57 See, e.g., id. at 715–16 (discussing the difficulty of measuring interstate migration).
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might expect national-level redistribution to be more effective. This
helps to explain why we see greater tax progressivity at the federal
level than at the state level. The structural explanation might be more
persuasive if it enjoyed more robust empirical support, but the relative
paucity of empirical evidence can be explained in part by the
endogeneity problems described in the previous paragraphs.
C. Federal Progressivity, State Regressivity: Institutional
Explanations
Institutional factors shed further light on the difference between
federal and state taxation. Seven states—Alaska, Florida, Nevada,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming—have no income
tax at all, and in some of those states the state constitution explicitly
or effectively prohibits income taxation.58 Two other states, New
Hampshire and Tennessee, tax dividends and interest but not labor
income, and Tennessee’s tax on dividends and interest is set to lapse
in 2022.59 The constitutions of five other states—Colorado, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—require that any income
tax be at a flat rate,60 while the constitution of Georgia imposes a six
percent cap on the individual income tax rate.61 Sixteen states
(including six of those previously mentioned) require legislative
supermajorities for some or all tax increases.62 All in all, half of all
states either have no general income tax, have a flat-tax requirement
58 See TIMOTHY D. HOGAN, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVENESS & PROSPERITY RESEARCH,
ARIZONA’S INCOME TAXES: A COMPARISON WITH OTHER STATES AND A POLICY
DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL TAX REFORMS 12 (2016), https://wpcarey.asu.edu/sites/default/
files/incometax07-16.pdf.
59 See Richard Locker, Gov. Bill Haslam Signs Hall Income Tax Cut, Repeal into Law,
TENNESSEAN (May 20, 2016, 12:09 PM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/
2016/05/20/gov-bill-haslam-signs-hall-income-tax-cut-repeal-into-law/84044810.
60 See ARIZ. LEGISLATURE, JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMM., PERSONAL INCOME
TAX SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES: PRESENTATION TO THE JOINT TASK FORCE ON
INCOME TAX REFORM (2013), https://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/jtfitr-090413.pdf.
61 See Liz Farmer, Georgia Becomes First State to Cap Income Taxes, GOVERNING
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-georgia-caps-income-tax-
rate.html.
62 In Arkansas and Oklahoma, a three-fourths vote of the legislature is required for a
tax increase. (Arkansas allows an exception for increases to sales and alcohol taxes.) A
two-thirds requirement applies in Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri,
Nevada, South Dakota, and Washington. A three-fifths vote is required in Delaware,
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Oregon. A three-fourths requirement applies to property tax
increases in Michigan. A three-fifths requirement applies to corporate income tax increases
in Florida. See TAX POLICY CTR., STATES WITH LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY
REQUIREMENTS TO INCREASE TAXES, 2010 (2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/taxfacts/content/PDF/state_supermajority.pdf.
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or rate cap, or have a legislative supermajority requirement that
applies to income tax increases.63
FIGURE 4. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE-LEVEL
PROGRESSIVITY64
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The institutional explanation for the relative regressivity of state
taxes is still not fully satisfying for two reasons. First, it remains the
case that half of all states do have an income tax, do not have a flat-
tax requirement or a rate cap, and do not have legislative
supermajority requirements for tax increases. And yet even the most
progressive states among the remaining half of states have relatively
flat tax systems.65 Second, the observation that half of the states face
institutional barriers to progressive taxation does not explain why
those institutional barriers exist in the first place.
Arguably, the institutional explanation for state-level regressivity
is simply a feature of the structural story: Constitutional limits on pro-
gressive income taxation function as a commitment device so that
states can persuade high-income households to move in and dissuade
low-income households from doing the same. In any event, these insti-
tutional variables give us further reason to expect that state tax
63 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See supra notes 58–62.
64 Id.
65 See supra Part I.A.
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systems will retain their regressive structure for the time being. To be
sure, supermajority thresholds are not insuperable, and states can
change their constitutions to eliminate income tax bans, caps, or flat-
rate requirements. Yet the assertion here is not that state-level regres-
sivity is a permanent feature of fiscal federalism; rather, the more
modest assumption upon which the analysis below rests is that state
tax systems will remain relatively regressive for the foreseeable future.
II
FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND THE ALLOCATION OF
ENTITLEMENTS
At this point, the Article shifts from public finance to constitu-
tional law—and, in particular, to three constitutional law doctrines
that set the stage for the argument in Part III: the anti-
commandeering doctrine, the anti-coercion doctrine, and the state
sovereign immunity doctrine. The following sections provide back-
ground on these doctrines.
A. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
The landmark decisions laying out the anti-commandeering rule
are New York v. United States and Printz v. United States. This section
provides a brief overview of both decisions and the doctrine for which
they have come to stand.
1. New York v. United States
The factual background of New York v. United States is, in Justice
O’Connor’s words, “intricate.”66 For the purposes of this discussion,
the key fact is that the statute at issue—the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 198567—included a so-called “take
title provision” requiring states to either (a) establish a waste disposal
program consistent with congressional standards by the beginning of
1996 or (b) assume ownership over (and thus, liability for) waste gen-
erated in-state.68 Congress offered monetary incentives to states if
they met certain statutory time targets for setting up their waste dis-
posal arrangements, but it did not allow them to opt out of the federal
low-level radioactive waste regime entirely.69
66 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 151 (1992).
67 Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j).
68 Id. § 5(d)(2)(C), 99 Stat. at 1851.
69 New York, 505 U.S. at 152–53.
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Five years after the take title provision was enacted, the State of
New York challenged the statute on various constitutional grounds.70
The case took two more years to wind its way to the Supreme Court,
where New York found a receptive audience. By a 6-3 margin, the
Court concluded: “Whether one views the take title provision as lying
outside Congress’ enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision
is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government estab-
lished by the Constitution.”71 Justice O’Connor, writing for the
majority, elaborated:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and
because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be
beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the
power to offer the States a choice between the two. . . . Either way,
“the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program” . . . .72
In Justice O’Connor’s (and the Court’s) view, congressional com-
mandeering of state legislatures poses a threat to democratic
processes. In situations “where the Federal Government directs the
States to regulate,” voters may not know whether federal elected offi-
cials or state elected officials deserve the credit—or blame—for the
policy.73 Justice O’Connor and her colleagues feared that comman-
deering would allow members of Congress and their state counter-
parts to pass the hot potato of political accountability back and forth,
leaving voters uncertain as to which officials are responsible.74
My focus here is not at all on Justice O’Connor’s reasoning, but
rather on the consequences of the rule she sets forth. As Roderick
Hills puts it, “New York provides a particular kind of entitlement to
state governments that is protected by a property rule.”75 That is, it
gives states a property right in their own legislative processes.76 At the
same time, the New York rule does not prevent Congress from
70 New York initially argued that the Act was “inconsistent with the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments to the Constitution, with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.” Id. at 154.
71 Id. at 177.
72 Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)).
73 Id. at 168–69.
74 Id.
75 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 822
(1998).
76 Id.
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purchasing legislation from states in an “intergovernmental market-
place.”77 The constitutional infirmity in the take title provision lay in
the fact that Congress had seized this entitlement from the states
rather than acquiring it through voluntary exchange.
2. Printz v. United States
The story of Printz begins with the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act in 1993,78 which established a new system of back-
ground checks for potential purchasers of firearms.79 It required gun
dealers to collect statements (Brady Forms) from potential purchasers
and to transmit the contents of those Brady Forms (including the
potential purchaser’s name, address, and date of birth) to the chief law
enforcement officer (CLEO) of the potential purchaser’s home juris-
diction. The Act also required the CLEO to make a “reasonable
effort” to determine—within five business days—whether the poten-
tial purchaser was a convicted felon, an illegal alien, or otherwise pro-
hibited from acquiring a firearm.80 If the background check came out
clean, the CLEO had to destroy records of the Brady Form and the
transaction.81 CLEOs would only be exempt from these requirements
if their states instituted instant background-check systems.82
Shortly after the Brady Act took effect, Jay Printz, the sheriff
(and thus the CLEO) of Ravalli County, Montana, brought a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the background-check system.83
Printz “object[ed] to being pressed into federal service, and con-
tend[ed] that congressional action compelling state officers to execute
federal laws is unconstitutional.”84 Five Justices agreed. While New
77 Id. at 819.
78 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921–22 (2006)).
79 Id. § 103, 107 Stat. at 1541–43 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922). Arguably,
the story begins much earlier—in March 1981, when White House Press Secretary James
Brady was shot in the head by John Hinckley, Jr. After his near-death experience, Brady
became a leading figure in the gun control movement, and when Congress ultimately
enacted comprehensive federal gun-control legislation, it honored his efforts by titling the
statute in his name. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE
PREVENTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 102-47, at 4–8 (1991).
80 Id. § 102(a), 107 Stat. at 1536–38 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006)).
81 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 903–04 (1997).
82 Id. at 903. An individual purchaser would be exempt if she or he “possesse[d] a state
handgun permit issued after a background check.” Id. But unless every potential purchaser
who was a resident of a jurisdiction possessed a state permit, the CLEO would still have to
comply with Brady Act requirements in some circumstances.
83 Id. at 904 (citing Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994)). His
case was consolidated with another action brought by the CLEO of Graham County,
Arizona. Id. (citing Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994)).
84 Id. at 905.
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York held that Congress cannot “commandeer[] the legislative
processes of the States,”85 Printz made clear that the same anti-com-
mandeering rule applied to state administrative resources.86 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that “[T]he Federal Gov-
ernment may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regula-
tory program.”87
Importantly, Printz still allows state executive officials to be con-
tracted into the service of Congress. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
in Printz makes it quite clear that “Congress is . . . free to amend the
program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the
States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal pro-
grams.”88 Again, the constitutional infirmity lay in the fact that Con-
gress had taken this entitlement from the states rather than buying it.
B. The Anti-Coercion Rule
Since New York and Printz, the Supreme Court has not struck
down another federal statute on anti-commandeering grounds (per-
haps because the New York/Printz rule is clear enough that Congress
knows not to violate it).89 The Roberts Court’s 2012 decision in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),90
however, breathes new life into a related doctrine that serves to sup-
plement the anti-commandeering rule. The facts will be familiar to
most readers, and so I will not belabor them here. In brief: The
Affordable Care Act of 2010 required states receiving Medicaid
funding (which is to say, every state) to expand eligibility to all citi-
zens with a family income of up to 133% of the federal poverty line.91
This was, of course, in addition to the much more prominent and also-
litigated “individual mandate” requiring most Americans to maintain
a minimum level of health insurance.92 The federal government would
85 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
86 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
89 As of this writing, a challenge to a federal statute that limits the ability of states to
repeal their gambling prohibitions was pending before the Supreme Court. See Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), cert.
granted sub nom. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017).
90 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
91 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
92 See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 530–31.
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pay all of the costs of covering newly eligible individuals through 2016
and at least 90% thereafter.93 Twenty-six states challenged the indi-
vidual mandate as well as the Medicaid expansion requirement.94 By a
5-4 vote the Court upheld the individual mandate as an exercise of
Congress’s taxing power, but by a 7-2 vote, it struck down the Medi-
caid expansion requirement.95 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, the
Affordable Care Act put “a gun to the head” of state governments:
Expand Medicaid to new groups or else lose all federal Medicaid
funding (which for most states would mean more than 10% of their
budget).96 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the Affordable Care
Act thus crossed the line from “financial inducement” to unconstitu-
tional coercion.97
The NFIB decision leaves the outer contours of this anti-coercion
doctrine unclear (indeed, intentionally so).98 It is thus too early to say
for sure how the anti-coercion doctrine interacts with the property
rule established by New York and Printz, but one way to frame it
might be as follows: The anti-commandeering doctrine vests states
with control over their legislative processes and administrative capa-
bilities, although it allows the states to transfer their entitlement to
Congress in a voluntary exchange. And the anti-coercion rule ensures
that once Congress and the states enter into such an exchange, Con-
gress cannot use its leverage to radically change the terms. In this way,
the anti-coercion rule serves as something like a public law analogue
to the private law doctrines of duress and unconscionability.
C. State Sovereign Immunity
The third doctrine under focus here is the state sovereign immu-
nity doctrine. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a four-Justice plu-
rality held that Congress can abrogate the sovereign immunity of
states pursuant to its power under the Constitution’s Commerce
93 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2012).
94 NFIB, 567 U.S. at 685–86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan to
uphold the mandate. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Kagan joined Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito to strike down the mandatory Medicaid expansion. Id.
at 529, 589, 646, 689.
96 Id. at 581–82.
97 Id. at 580–82, 588 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)) (holding
the Medicaid expansion “violates the Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid
funding” and thereby precluding Congress “from imposing such a sanction”).
98 In the Chief Justice’s words, “The Court in Steward Machine did not attempt to ‘fix
the outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion. . . . We have no need to fix a
line either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely
beyond it.” Id. at 585 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)).
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Clause.99 In short order, the Supreme Court overruled that holding. In
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida100 and then in Alden v. Maine,101
the Court established that Commerce Clause does not empower Con-
gress to abrogate states’ immunity from suit—either in federal court
or in their own courts. This section summarizes those cases and
explains the allocation of entitlements following from those decisions.
1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
which provided that Indian tribes can conduct specified gaming activi-
ties only pursuant to a compact with the state in which the activities
occur.102 The Act also required states to negotiate with tribes “in good
faith” to enter into such a compact,103 and allowed tribes to sue states
in federal court to compel states to comply with the good-faith negoti-
ation mandate.104 In 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida sued the
State of Florida and its governor, seeking to compel the state to nego-
tiate a gaming compact in good faith.105 The case reached the
Supreme Court and provided the Justices with an opportunity to
reconsider—and potentially overrule—Union Gas.
A five-Justice majority seized that opportunity. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court, “Union Gas was wrongly decided and
. . . should be, and now is, overruled.”106 He elaborated: “Even when
the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congres-
sional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States.”107
Note the second-to-last word in the previous paragraph: Seminole
Tribe held that Congress cannot abrogate the sovereign immunity of
“unconsenting” states.108 It did not prohibit states from trading their
sovereign immunity to the federal government as part of a voluntary
exchange. In this respect, the state sovereign immunity doctrine
99 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15, 23 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“Congress has the power to abrogate immunity when exercising its plenary authority to
regulate interstate commerce.”), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
100 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
101 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
102 Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 11(d)(1)(C), 102 Stat. 2472, 2475 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012)).
103 Id. § 11(d)(3)(A).
104 Id. § 11(d)(7).
105 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51–52.
106 Id. at 66.
107 Id. at 72.
108 Id.
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resembles the anti-commandeering doctrine: It assigns the states an
entitlement protected by a property rule, but not an inalienable enti-
tlement. States still can sell that entitlement if Congress’s price is
right. (Note as well that Seminole Tribe does not prevent Congress
from abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Recon-
struction Amendments.109 The holding in Seminole Tribe only pre-
vents Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to
its powers under Article I.110)
2. Alden v. Maine
Seminole Tribe “made it clear that Congress lacks power under
Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suits com-
menced or prosecuted in the federal courts.”111 The holding rested on
the Eleventh Amendment, which by its terms does not apply to suits
in state courts.112 Alden v. Maine presented the Justices with an oppor-
tunity to decide whether Congress—pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power—can abrogate state sovereign immunity in state court.113
In Alden, a group of probation officers sued their employer, the
State of Maine, in state court for violating the overtime pay provisions
of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The same five-Justice
majority from Seminole Tribe held that the probation officers could
not proceed with their suit. As Justice Kennedy wrote for the slender
majority: “In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of
the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private
suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power
to abrogate by Article I legislation.”114
Alden was not the Court’s last word on state sovereign immunity.
In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court carved out
an exception to the Seminole Tribe/Alden rule for cases involving the
109 Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452–56 (1976)).
110 See id. at 73 (“Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
111 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (emphasis added).
112 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”). Nor does the Eleventh Amendment by its terms apply to suits by citizens against
their own states in federal court, although the Court extended the Eleventh Amendment to
bar such suits long ago. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not authorize suits by individuals against the states in federal
court).
113 Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
114 Id. at 754.
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federal bankruptcy laws.115 So in the bankruptcy context as well as the
Reconstruction Amendments, the power to decide whether states are
immune from private citizen suits lies with Congress, not with the
states. But outside those (relatively limited) contexts, states possess an
entitlement to sovereign immunity that Congress cannot take away.
III
THE COURT, THE COASE THEOREM, AND THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
Part II explained that the anti-commandeering and state sover-
eign immunity doctrines vest the states with valuable entitlements: In
the anti-commandeering case, an entitlement to control over their
own legislative processes and administrative resources; in the sover-
eign immunity case, an entitlement to freedom from monetary liability
in federal or state court. The anti-coercion rule then acts as something
like an unconscionability or duress doctrine protecting states’ end of
the bargain in intergovernmental exchanges. Yet beyond the (as yet
ill-defined) limits on federal-state exchanges imposed by the anti-
coercion doctrine, the states are generally free to sell their entitle-
ments in the intergovernmental market. This part considers the distri-
butional implications of federalism doctrines given the possibility of
intergovernmental bargaining. Part III.A discusses the implications of
these doctrines for the intergovernmental distribution of wealth. Part
III.B provides a preliminary analysis of the relationship between
intergovernmental and interpersonal wealth distribution, while also
identifying a number of complications that will be explored at greater
length in Part IV.
A. Fiscal Federalism Meets the Coase Theorem
The analysis begins with a provocative essay written in the wake
of Seminole Tribe by Daniel Farber. The essay is three pages in full,
and the heart of the argument is as easily excerpted as summarized.
Farber writes:
The Coase Theorem simply states that, assuming that transaction
costs don’t prevent contracting around legal rules, the legal rules
don’t matter—or more precisely, that the parties will always bargain
their way to an economically efficient outcome, regardless of the
legal rule. Bargaining washes away legal rules, in other words. If the
Eleventh Amendment immunity were inalienable, the Coase The-
orem would not apply, since it would be impossible to bargain. But
115 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that Congress may “treat States in the same way as
other creditors” for purposes of federal bankruptcy law).
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one of the few things that is really clear about the Eleventh Amend-
ment is that it is subject to waiver: the Constitution does not pater-
nalistically force states to retain their immunities against their wills.
In addition, Congress seems to be free to offer incentives for
waiver. . . . So bargaining is possible. It follows from the Coase The-
orem that, if Congress wants to eliminate immunity more than the
state wants to keep it, then it will be eliminated—regardless of
whether the Constitution recognizes sovereign immunity or gives
Congress the power to abrogate immunity. So, to a first approxima-
tion, the Eleventh Amendment doesn’t matter.116
In other words, the Coase Theorem would lead us to believe that
absent transaction costs, Congress will purchase entitlements from
states where Congress assigns a higher value to the entitlements than
the states do. Congress will pay the states to administer federal pro-
grams where the states can do so more efficiently than federal agen-
cies can. So too, Congress will pay the states to waive their sovereign
immunity when such waivers advance federal objectives more than
they burden states.
Some readers might pause at this point and ask whether the inter-
governmental market is even plausibly Coasean. The fact that many of
these intergovernmental deals are embodied in federal statutes no
doubt introduces rigidities to the bargaining process, making it more
difficult for Congress and the states to adjust prices and other contract
terms. But this point ought not be overemphasized. Congress often
offers different deals to different states implementing federal pro-
grams. For example, the federal government matches Massachusetts’s
Medicaid expenditures dollar for dollar, but contributes $3.11 for
every dollar that Mississippi spends on Medicaid.117 Many other
pieces of legislation contain different deals for different states: The
unique role for California with respect to tailpipe pollution standards
under the Clean Air Act is illustrative.118 Among the most famous (or
infamous) provisions of this sort is the “Cornhusker Kickback,” a
commitment of additional Medicaid funds to Nebraska added to the
Affordable Care Act in order to win the vote of that state’s senator,
116 Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 141, 142 (1996) (footnotes and paragraph breaks omitted).
117 Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, 81 Fed. Reg.
80,078, 80,079–80 (Nov. 15, 2016). On Medicaid matching, see generally Kirk J. Stark, Rich
States, Poor States: Assessing the Design and Effect of a U.S. Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63
TAX L. REV. 957, 991–94 (2010).
118 The Clean Air Act allows California to adopt emissions standards that are more
stringent than the federal standards under certain circumstances and allows other states to
emulate California’s rules. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7543(e)(2) (2006).
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Ben Nelson.119 (While the Cornhusker Kickback did not make it into
the ultimate law,120 a special Medicaid funding provision for Louisiana
did.121) And even after a bill becomes law, there are ample opportuni-
ties for state-specific deals executed through waiver provisions. For
example, the Department of Education under President Obama
reached waiver agreements with dozens of states receiving federal
funding under the No Child Left Behind Act.122 Renegotiation of
terms between the Department of Health and Human Services and
the fifty states is very much a feature of Medicaid implementation as
well.123
Importantly, Coasean analysis on its own does not give us a
reason to favor one initial allocation of entitlements over the other.
After all, the same logic would suggest that if the Court had allocated
the relevant entitlements to Congress rather than the states, then the
states would purchase the entitlements back from the federal govern-
ment when the states assign a higher value to the entitlements than
Congress does. If Congress commandeered the states to administer a
particular program but the cost to a state of administering the pro-
gram exceeded the cost to the federal government, then the state
would purchase the services of the appropriate federal agency. And
likewise, if Congress made the states liable to lawsuits of a particular
sort but the cost of liability to a state exceeded the value that Con-
gress ascribed to state liability, then the state would purchase immu-
nity from the federal government.
119 See David Weigel, Does Antonin Scalia Know What’s in the Affordable Care Law?,
SLATE: WEIGEL BLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2012/
03/28/does_antonin_scalia_know_what_s_in_the_affordable_care_law_.html.
120 Id.
121 See Avik S.A. Roy, The New Louisiana Purchase: Obamacare’s $4.3 Billion
Boondoggle, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/03/the-new-louisiana-purchase-obamacares-43-billion-boondoggle/254003. A similar
state-specific provision, “the Buffalo Buyout,” appeared in the failed American Health
Care Act that Congressional Republicans sought to pass in early 2017. See Daniel Hemel,
Is the Buffalo Buyout Constitutional?, MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Mar. 23,
2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/is-the-buffalo-buyout-constitutional-
fbc2c9cad53.
122 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 279–81 (2013) (discussing the Obama Administration’s use of its “statutorily
conferred waiver authority” to “revamp” No Child Left Behind).
123 See Michael Greve, Our Polarized, Presidential Federalism, in PARCHMENT
BARRIERS: POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
(Zachary C. Courser, Eric A. Helland & Kenneth P. Miller, eds., forthcoming) manuscript
at 8, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885932 (“[a]dministrations under presidents of both parties
have routinely used broad ‘Section 1115’ waivers under Medicaid, to the point where none
of the actual state programs has much to do with the statutory parameters.”).
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One might doubt the premise that states would ever purchase ser-
vices or immunity from Congress if the entitlement allocation were
the opposite of what it is today. But perhaps that doubt is misplaced.
Indeed, one might think of New York v. United States as exactly such a
case of states buying entitlements from the federal government.
Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act,
states either had to establish the capacity to dispose of low-level radio-
active waste generated within their borders by January 1, 1993, or else
forfeit certain funds to the Secretary of Energy.124 In effect, the Act
said to the states: “Administer or pay.” Moreover, the Act decreed
that states would be liable for all damages incurred by generators or
owners of low-level radioactive waste unless the state provided for the
disposal of such waste by January 1, 1996.125 In other words, Congress
abrogated the immunity of states from claims by waste generators/
owners but then offered to sell that immunity back to the states in
exchange for a particular form of consideration (here, the state taking
over the disposal process).
Outside the low-level radioactive waste context, it is not unheard
of for states to purchase administrative services from federal agencies.
During the October 2013 federal government shutdown, several states
paid the U.S. Department of the Interior to continue to operate
national parks and monuments within those states.126 One might think
of this as the states and the Department of the Interior engaging in a
voluntary exchange where the value that the states ascribe to federal
administration is greater than the cost to the relevant federal agency.
A similar phenomenon emerges in the procurement context, with
state and local governments effectively purchasing procurement ser-
vices from the Federal General Services Administration.127
In any event, the argument in the next section will not rest on the
premise that if New York and Printz had gone the other way, states
would pay the federal government not to commandeer state legislative
and executive functions. Nor will the argument depend on the premise
that if Seminole Tribe and Alden had gone the other way, states would
purchase back their immunity entitlement from Congress under cer-
tain circumstances. Rather, the argument is that the Rehnquist
124 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1992).
125 See id. at 153–54.
126 See Howard Berkes, Some States Allowed to Reopen National Parks—And Foot the
Bill, NPR (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/10/11/
232090272/utah-allowed-to-re-open-national-parks-and-foot-the-bill.
127 See, e.g., General Services Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,425 (July 6, 2016)
(concerning rates at which state and local governments can purchase goods and services
through the Federal General Services Administration).
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Court’s initial assignment of entitlements to the states causes Con-
gress to pay the states more than it would if the initial assignment of
entitlements had turned out differently. States’ right of refusal allows
them to extract more resources from Congress in intergovernmental
bargaining. The Coase Theorem serves to illustrate this, but the
assumption of zero transaction costs and two-way tradability
embedded in the Coase Theorem are not necessary components of the
analysis.
Even on its own terms, however, Farber’s application of the
Coase Theorem to fiscal federalism misses an important element of
the Coase Theorem. Coase never said that the legal allocation of enti-
tlements “doesn’t matter,” as Farber asserts.128 Rather, Coase
acknowledges that the allocation of entitlements will affect “the distri-
bution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the
farmer.”129 Neil Siegel has noted this oversight in Farber’s analysis,
and has done so quite succinctly. He illustrates the point with a
straightforward example:
Suppose that in enacting particular legislation, Congress would be
willing to pay $10 million to render the state of California suscep-
tible to suit in federal court for its violations of that statute. Suppose
further that California is opposed to being vulnerable to such suits,
and would be willing to pay $5 million for a substantive immunity.
The cost-benefit efficient solution in this case is for California to be
susceptible to suit in federal court for violations of the statute, since
the benefit to Congress of $10 million exceeds the cost to California
of $5 million . . . . Assuming no transaction costs, this outcome will
be achieved regardless of the controlling constitutional law of state
sovereign immunity . . . . Nevertheless, the distributive conse-
quences associated with the alternative legal regimes under exami-
nation are far from irrelevant. Under Union Gas, Congress ends up
with a benefit of $10 million and California incurs a cost of $5 mil-
lion. Under Seminole, Congress obtains a net benefit of $2.5 million
(a $10 million benefit from California’s waiver less the purchase
price of $7.5 million), and California nets $2.5 million (receipt of a
$7.5 million payment less the $5 million cost of waiver). Thus,
although the law does not matter from the aggregate standpoint of
efficiency, it matters a whole lot to each of these competing
sovereigns.130
If Siegel’s analysis is right, then we might expect to see an
increase in federal-to-state transfers after decisions such as New York,
128 Farber, supra note 114, at 142.
129 See Coase, supra note 21, at 5.
130 Neil S. Siegel, Why the Eleventh Amendment Always Matters, Even When
Transaction Costs Are Zero, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 177, 182 (2001).
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Seminole Tribe, Printz, and Alden that allocate valuable entitlements
to the states. Or, if Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York is correct
to suggest that the holding in New York follows from the Court’s 1981
decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Associa-
tion,131 we might expect to see a spike begin there. And to some
extent, we do. As a share of gross domestic product and as a share of
federal outlays, federal-to-state transfers rose significantly starting
shortly after Hodel and through the 1990s, as the Supreme Court rein-
forced the anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity doc-
trines. Figure 5 so illustrates, with a gray dotted line denoting the year
of Hodel (1981) and black dotted lines marking the years in which
New York, Seminole Tribe, Printz, and Alden were handed down
(1992, 1996, 1997, and 1999).
FIGURE 5. FEDERAL-TO-STATE TRANSFERS AS PERCENT OF GDP
AND OF FEDERAL OUTLAYS, 1976—2016132
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131 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (citing Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981), for the proposition that
Congress lacks the constitutional authority to “commandeer[] the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program”). In Hodel, the Court found that challenged provisions of the Surface Mining
Act did not cross the line between “cooperative federalism” and “commandeering.” 452
U.S. at 288–89.
132 The data for Figure 5 are drawn from OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FY 2018
HISTORICAL TABLES (Table 12.1), supra note 37.
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To be sure, the increase illustrated in Figure 5 cannot be attrib-
uted entirely to the Supreme Court. For one thing, the upward trend
starts several years before New York (though as noted above, and as
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York contends, several decisions
over the course of the 1980s arguably anticipated the New York
holding).133 And second, the rise in federal-to-state transfers in the
1990s coincided with a number of other significant events, including
the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the Gingrich Revolution in 1994.
Any claim that the Supreme Court was the sole cause of the rise in
federal-to-state transfers at the end of the twentieth century would be
subject to ridicule.
Moreover, even if federalism doctrines play some role in the rise
of federal-to-state transfers in the 1990s, the fact remains that federal-
to-state transfers were significant in size long before any of the above-
mentioned decisions.134 This fact lends itself to a pair of possible inter-
pretations. One is that the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and
state sovereign immunity cases are manifestations of a long-under-
stood norm in American political culture: Congress cannot tell the
states what to do (though it may pay them to do what Congress
wants).135 Another (not incompatible) view is that federalism norms
in American political culture began to break down in the 1990s, and
that the Rehnquist Court intervened to protect these principles long
immanent in America’s (written or unwritten) fiscal constitution.136
Whether the allocation of these valuable entitlements to states
rather than the federal government started in recent decades or began
133 See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–62; cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513
(1988) (noting that “the Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress’ power to
compel[] States to regulate on behalf of federal interests”); Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (stating that a statute survives scrutiny
where it does not “‘directly compel’ the States to enact a legislative program”); Hodel, 452
U.S. at 288 (indicating that a statute survives Tenth Amendment scrutiny where it does not
“commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program”).
134 On the history of federal-to-state transfers, see John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E.
Oates, The Impact of the New Deal on American Federalism, in THE DEFINING MOMENT:
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
155, 157–59 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 2014).
135 See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 107 (1861) (“[T]he Federal Government,
under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty
whatever, and compel him to perform it . . . .”). On the early history of the anti-
commandeering doctrine, see generally Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and
Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104 (2013).
136 Cf. Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272
(1977) (defining the “Fiscal Constitution” as “the sum of constitutional provisions bearing
on taxation and expenditure, including both rules defining the fiscal competence of the
branches of the federal government and rules allocating taxing and spending powers
between the federal government and the states”).
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long before, we have strong theoretical and some empirical grounds
for believing that this allocation of entitlements makes the states
richer and the federal government poorer. But that is not, I will argue,
the end of the matter. The next section turns to the interpersonal dis-
tributional consequences of these intergovernmental entitlement allo-
cations—and, in particular, the ways in which these entitlement
allocations differentially affect taxpayers of various incomes.
B. A Toy Model of Federal and State Taxing and Spending
To recapitulate: The anti-commandeering and state sovereign
immunity doctrines each assign to the states a valuable entitlement
that the states can sell back to Congress on the intergovernmental
market.137 If intergovernmental bargaining is Coasean, then the initial
entitlement allocation will not determine whether the states ultimately
enact and enforce federal programs or whether the states ultimately
enjoy immunity from lawsuits in their own and federal courts: Con-
gress will purchase the entitlement from the states if Congress assigns
a higher value to the entitlement than states do. Yet even under
Coasean conditions, the initial allocation of entitlements does have a
distributive effect: It enriches the party to whom the entitlement is
allocated.
A toy model will allow us to begin to explore the interpersonal
distributive effects of the intergovernmental allocation of entitle-
ments. Imagine that Congress’s entire budget is devoted to national
defense, and that the states’ entire budget is devoted to schools.
Imagine, moreover, that society is composed of two groups: the
Riches and the Rest. Consistent with the breakdown between the top
decile and the bottom nine deciles in Table 1, we will assume that the
Riches (the top decile) bear 50% of the federal tax burden and 40%
of the state tax burden, with the remainder falling to the Rest. Let’s
assume, moreover, that the federal government and the states each
start out with budgets of $100. Thus, the Riches pay $50 of federal
taxes and $40 of state taxes for a total of $90, while the Rest pay $50
of federal taxes and $60 of state taxes for a total of $110. The first
column of Table 2 reflects the status quo.
Now imagine that members of Congress decide to create a new
health care program (we’ll call it Medicaid). Assume, moreover, that
New York and Printz have come out the other way: Congress has the
power to commandeer state legislative processes and administrative
resources pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Also assume that
137 The anti-coercion doctrine, recall, regulates the terms on which these
intergovernmental transactions may occur. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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members of Congress would prefer, all else equal, not to raise federal
taxes. Finally, assume that the states can administer Medicaid at a cost
of $10, while it would cost some amount more than $10 for the federal
government to do the same.
In our non-Printz world, we might expect Congress to comman-
deer the states and compel them to administer the Medicaid program.
Moreover, and most importantly for our purposes, we might expect
Congress to saddle states with the entire cost of Medicaid. The states
will then have to find an additional $10 to pay for Medicaid. If they do
so by raising taxes while maintaining their existing tax structure, then
the result will be an additional $4 in taxes paid by the Rich and $6 in
taxes paid by the Rest. The Rich now pay a total of $94 in federal and
state taxes, and the Rest now pay a total of $116. The second column
of Table 2 reflects this non-Printz scenario.
Now, imagine that the Supreme Court rules for the states in
Printz. Instead of Congress foisting the cost of Medicaid onto the
states, the states now have the entitlement to their own legislative
processes and administrative resources, and so they can hold out until
Congress makes an offer at least sweet enough to offset the cost of
administering Medicaid. We will assume for the sake of simplicity that
Congress captures all of the contractual surplus (i.e., the federal gov-
ernment pays an amount equal to the states’ cost of administering
Medicaid, rather than an amount equal to the federal government’s
higher cost of administering Medicaid). The federal government now
has to raise an additional $10 in revenues, which it does by imposing
an additional tax of $5 on the Rich and $5 on the Rest. The Rich now
pay a total of $95 in federal plus state taxes, while the Rest pay a total
of $115. The third column of Table 2 illustrates.
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TABLE 2. TOY MODEL—ALL ADJUSTMENTS ON TAX SIDE
(1) (2) (3)
Starting Position Commandeering Printz
Federal
Defense Spending $100 $100 $100
Medicaid Spending — — $10
Taxes $100 $100 $110
Rich $50 $50 $55
Rest $50 $50 $55
State
School Spending $100 $100 $100
Medicaid Spending — $10 —
Taxes $100 $110 $100
Rich $40 $44 $40
Rest $60 $66 $60
Total
Total Spending $200 $210 $210
Total Taxes $200 $210 $210
Rich $90 $94 $95
Rest $110 $116 $115
In this initial version of the toy model, Printz results in a transfer
of $1 from the Rich to the Rest. The cause of this transfer is easy to
see: Printz leads to more revenue being raised through the more pro-
gressive federal tax system, and correspondingly less revenue being
raised through the more regressive state tax systems. There are, how-
ever, several reasons to wonder whether reality will work out this
neatly. For example, the shift in wealth from state to federal govern-
ments effected by Printz might lead the federal tax system to become
less progressive or state systems to become more so. Moreover, the
states might respond to a Medicaid mandate under Printz by cutting
school spending rather than raising taxes; so too, the federal govern-
ment might respond to the costs imposed by Printz through defense
spending cuts. Also, transaction costs might stand in the way of fed-
eral-state exchanges, such that the consequence of Printz is less
spending overall rather than more federal taxation and less state-level
revenue raising. Furthermore, the federal government and/or the
states might export present-period costs to future generations through
public debt. And finally, the possibilities limned here might not be
mutually exclusive: We might see a bit of each in reality. The next part
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/02/2018   14:13:19
40084-nyu_93-1 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/02/2018   14:13:19
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 39  2-APR-18 13:29
April 2018] FEDERALISM AS A SAFEGUARD 39
turns to the question of which—if any—of these outcomes might be
most plausible.
IV
COMPLICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
The previous Part laid out the basic intuition underlying the claim
that federalism doctrines allocating valuable entitlements to states
rather than the federal government generate progressive redistribu-
tive effects at the individual/household level. The goal of this part is to
stress-test that claim—that is, to question each of the underlying
assumptions so as to determine just how robust the basic intuition is.
Part IV.A considers the possibility that adjustments to the progres-
sivity of federal and state tax systems will offset the interpersonal
redistributive effects of a federal-to-state wealth shift. Part IV.B con-
siders the potential for spending-side adjustments. Part IV.C
addresses the potential for federalism doctrines to affect the overall
size of government. Part IV.D considers the possibility of borrowing
by either federal or state governments, with potential implications for
the distribution of income and wealth across generations. Part IV.E
assesses the relevance of legally grounded federalism doctrines given
the political safeguards of federalism that (arguably) exist as a
backdrop.
A. Adjustments to the Progressivity of Federal and State Tax
Systems
The basic model illustrated in Table 2 assumed that in all scena-
rios, the Rich would pay 50% of federal taxes and 40% of state taxes.
The analysis in Parts I.A and I.B pointed toward reasons why it might
be difficult for states to adjust the progressivity of their tax systems.
Yet those structural and institutional constraints at the state level do
not preclude the possibility of a federal-side adjustment. Imagine that
Congress responds to the shift from a pro-commandeering rule to
Printz still by raising $110 but now also adjusting the split of federal
taxes so that the Rich pay only 49.1% of federal taxes, or $54. The
result would be that the Rich would pay the same amount in total
taxes as before. This outcome would be consistent with what Lee Fen-
nell and Richard McAdams refer to as the “distributive invariance
hypothesis”: “that the same distributive result will be achieved regard-
less of how legal rules are configured or how entitlements to resources
are assigned.”138
138 Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2016).
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TABLE 3. TOY MODEL—ADJUSTMENTS TO PROGRESSIVITY
(4)
(2) (3)
Printz Plus
Commandeering Printz
Adjustment
Federal
Defense Spending $100 $100 $100
Medicaid Spending — $10 $10
Taxes $100 $110 $110
Rich $50 $55 $54
Rest $50 $55 $56
% of Taxes Paid by Rich 50% 50% 49.1%
State
School Spending $100 $100 $100
Medicaid Spending $10 — —
Taxes $110 $100 $100
Rich $44 $40 $40
Rest $66 $60 $60
Total
Total Spending $210 $210 $210
Total Taxes $210 $210 $210
Rich $94 $95 $94
Rest $116 $115 $116
Yet the distributive invariance hypothesis is not an iron law;
indeed, as Fennell and McAdams argue, it holds rarely if ever.139 And
there are strong reasons to believe that distributive invariance is vio-
lated here as well. This section considers two reasons why the invari-
ance hypothesis might not hold and one reason why it might. The
analysis is necessarily speculative and so the conclusions are necessa-
rily tentative. The theme throughout is that distributive invariance is
perhaps possible but far from inevitable in this context.
1. Different State Preferences for Progressivity. 
As an initial matter, we know that voters in different states have
different distributive preferences140 and face different constraints on
139 Id. at 1056. For a general critique of the invariance hypothesis across contexts, see id.
at 1079–109.
140 See David Rueda & Daniel Stegmueller, Preferences That Matter: Inequality,
Redistribution and Voting (Mar. 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://
www.buffalo.edu/content/www/baldycenter/events/events-archive/redistribution/
_jcr_content/par/download_6/file.res/RuedaStegmueller_PreferencesMatter.pdf
(discussing the relationship between voter preferences and state-level inequality).
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their ability to raise revenues via progressive taxation.141 We might
expect, then, that if states bear more of the revenue raising burden of
federal taxation, some states will place more of that burden on the
Rich and others will place more on the Rest. Imagine two types of
states—Blue and Red—with preferences for progressive redis-
tribution stronger in the former. Imagine, moreover, that the anti-
commandeering doctrine is discarded and so Congress can export rev-
enue raising responsibilities to the states, each of which allocates that
burden differently (with the Rest bearing a larger share of the burden
in Red than in Blue). Any effort to offset state-level tax changes
through a federal-level tax change would be overcompensatory in
Blue and undercompensatory in Red. The result would be to intro-
duce a horizontal inequity between low-income households in Blue
(who now pay less than under the anti-commandeering status quo)
and low-income households in Red (who now pay more).142 Note,
moreover, that lower-income states tend to be redder (i.e., more con-
servative) ones as well.143 Millions of low-income households would
thus be left in states that allocate larger shares of the tax burden to the
poor.
2. Different Marginal Costs of Taxation.
The plausibility of the invariance hypothesis also depends on why
we think federal-level progressivity and state-level regressivity emerge
in the first place. When federal and state lawmakers raise revenue via
taxation, they reap political benefits from additional spending and
bear political costs from voters who feel the brunt of those taxes. As a
141 On the latter point, see supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
142 We might perhaps imagine a federal intervention along the lines of the “progressive
state tax credit” proposed by Eric Kades. See Eric Kades, Giving Credit Where Credit Is
Due: Reducing Inequality with a Progressive State Tax Credit, 77 LA. L. REV. 359, 362
(2016). The goal of such an intervention would be to provide greater relief to low-income
households in states with more progressive tax systems. As Kades notes, an intervention
along these lines would be vulnerable to an argument that it violates the Constitution’s
Uniformity Clause, though Kades ultimately concludes that the Uniformity Clause
concerns are nonfatal. See id. at 408–14; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”).
How plausible is it that Congress will respond to a reversal of the anti-
commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines with an
intervention along the lines contemplated by Kades? As emphasized in the text, the result
depends in part on the reasons why progressive taxation emerges. If federal-level
progressivity is a direct response to voter preferences for redistribution, then Kades’s
proposal might seem more plausible. If federal-level progressivity is a function of different
marginal costs of raising revenue from different income groups, then we might expect a
shift in revenue raising responsibilities to result in an interpersonal wealth shift as well.
143 See Andrew Gelman et al., Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What’s the
Matter with Connecticut?, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 345, 352 (2007).
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first approximation, lawmakers support spending up to the point that
the marginal political benefits of an additional $1 of spending equal
the marginal political costs of an additional $1 of taxation. Meanwhile,
on the tax side, lawmakers allocate revenue raising burdens across
income groups. We might expect that lawmakers will allocate burdens
across the Rich and the Rest such that the marginal political cost of
raising an additional $1 of revenue from each group is the same. (Oth-
erwise, lawmakers could achieve political gains by tilting the tax
system more toward the Rich or toward the Rest.) Ceteris paribus, we
might expect—for reasons explored in Part I.B—that raising revenues
from the Rich will be costlier for state lawmakers than for federal
lawmakers. Thus we might expect that federal and state lawmakers
will allocate tax burdens differently, as indeed they do. Since the mar-
ginal cost of taxing the Rich relative to the Rest is lower for federal
than for state lawmakers, we might anticipate differences between
federal and state systems to endure even when revenue raising
responsibilities are shifted. Indeed, we would be surprised to see oth-
erwise: If the costs of taxing the rich at the state level are higher than
at the federal level, then why would we ever expect the states to
match the allocation of federal tax burdens across income groups?
3. Counterargument: Lump-Sum Taxation and Redistribution
Distinguished.
The intuitions in the previous paragraphs are not invulnerable to
counterargument. We might instead imagine a model along the fol-
lowing lines: The cost of public goods is $10 per household, and voters
desire redistribution of $5 from each household in the Rich to the
Rest. (For expositional ease, we will assume for present purposes that
the number of households among the Rich and the Rest is the same.)
We might imagine two ways in which revenue raising and redistribu-
tion could occur:
Scenario A.
All revenue raising and redistribution occurs through the federal
system. The federal government imposes a tax of $15 on households in
the Rich and $5 on households in the Rest. Each household is paying
its pro rata share of the cost of public goods ($10), and the Rich are
paying an extra $5, which is going to reduce the tax bill of the Rest by
$5.
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Scenario B.
All revenue raising to pay for public goods occurs through the
state systems, but redistribution occurs through the federal system.
States impose a lump-sum tax of $10 on each household, while the
federal government imposes a tax of $5 on each household in the Rich
and a tax of negative $5 on each household in the Rest (i.e., a subsidy
of $5). Each household is paying its pro rata share of public goods
($10), and the Rich are paying an extra $5 which is then transferred to
the Rest.
Scenario A would be consistent with a world in which the
Supreme Court disallows commandeering and congressional abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity; Scenario B would be consistent
with a world in which Congress is unconstrained by the anti-
commandeering and state sovereign immunity doctrines. The only
effect of federalism doctrines in these scenarios is to determine
whether the lump-sum component of revenue raising occurs at the
federal level or the state level.
Embedded in this argument is a strong assumption about redis-
tributive politics: If members of Congress would impose a $15 tax on
the Rich and a $5 tax on the Rest when revenue raising responsibili-
ties lie with the federal government, then members of Congress also
would impose a $5 tax on the Rich and a negative $5 tax on the Rest
when revenue raising responsibilities lie with the states. Put differ-
ently, the argument assumes away the magic of zero. By that, I mean
that the argument assumes a political equivalence between reductions
to tax and negative taxes. But the significance of zero cannot be dis-
carded so easily.
To elaborate: Scenario A and Scenario B both involved redistri-
bution of $5 from each household in the Rich to each household
among the Rest. The difference was that in Scenario A, $5 was added
to the federal tax bill of the Rich and subtracted from the tax bill of
the Rest, while in Scenario B, only the Rich paid federal taxes and the
Rest received what might be characterized as a “handout” of $5. As
more revenue raising occurs through the state systems, any effort to
hold the total level of redistribution constant will require more such
“handouts” from the federal government. If handouts to lower-
income households elicit more backlash than tax breaks for lower-
income households, then federalism doctrines that assign revenue
raising responsibilities to the states or the federal government will
indeed affect the political costs of redistribution.
Research in the lab by Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron
suggests that zero matters quite a lot—at least to voters. Across
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multiple studies, McCaffery and Baron find that “negative tax
brackets in one tax to offset positive brackets in others . . . are salient
and disfavored.”144 The details of their studies are quite complicated
(and lie beyond the scope of this Article); moreover, the external
validity of their laboratory findings is (of course) unclear. What we
can say is this: Evidence from the lab gives us reason to doubt that tax
rates will adjust seamlessly to a shift in revenue raising responsibilities
across levels of government, especially where adjustment might entail
a below-zero rate of federal taxation for some.
B. Adjustments to Federal and State Spending
A second possibility is that federal and state governments will
respond to the reallocation of valuable entitlements by holding their
tax systems constant and adjusting the amount of spending. Table 3
illustrates such an adjustment. Under commandeering, when the fed-
eral government imposes a cost of $10 on the states, states respond by
reducing their spending on schools by $10, with no changes to their tax
system. Under Printz, when that $10 cost is shifted to the federal gov-
ernment, Congress responds by cutting defense spending commensu-
rately—again, with no tax system changes. On this view, the only
effect of federalism doctrines is to determine the composition of gov-
ernment spending.
144 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1768 (2005); see also id. at 1771–72 (describing a “disaggregation
bias or isolation effect” resulting in subjects choosing a less progressive tax system when
asked about taxes in isolation instead of together with the provision of services).
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TABLE 4. TOY MODEL—ALL ADJUSTMENTS ON SPENDING SIDE
(2) (3)
Commandeering Printz
Federal
Defense Spending $100 $90
Medicaid Spending — $10
Taxes $100 $100
Rich $50 $50
Rest $50 $50
State
School Spending $90 $100
Medicaid Spending $10 —
Taxes $100 $100
Rich $40 $40
Rest $60 $60
Total
Total Spending $200 $200
Total Taxes $200 $200
Rich $90 $90
Rest $110 $110
How plausible are the adjustments imagined in Table 4? If federal
and state governments are responsive to voter desires, and if the fed-
eral and state governments already provide voters with the amount of
defense and school spending that they desire, then the answer is: quite
implausible. Why would we expect voter demand for national defense
or school spending to depend on whether revenue raising for
Medicaid occurs through the state or federal system? On the other
hand, if members of Congress incur a marginal political cost from
each additional $1 of federal (but not state) taxation, and if the mar-
ginal political cost of taxation is increasing, then federalism doctrines
may indeed affect the quantity of federal and state spending: Under
Printz, each $1 of spending is costlier to Congress and less so for state
lawmakers. In that event, the distributional consequences of feder-
alism doctrines will depend in part on whether a shift in spending
from the federal government to the states redounds to the benefit of
the rich or the poor.
We do know that federal and state governments spend their dol-
lars in very different ways. Figure 6 shows the percentage of federal
and state outlays by area for fiscal year 2016. Several similarities
as well as dramatic differences spring forward. Federal and state
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governments both spend heavily on health care, with Medicare a
larger share of the federal budget and Medicaid a larger share of state
budgets. Social Security and national defense are federal-only items;
elementary, secondary, and higher education compose a much larger
share of state budgets. These generalities will not be hugely surprising
to most readers.
FIGURE 6. FEDERAL AND STATE OUTLAYS BY AREA,
FISCAL YEAR 2016145
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If federal and state governments respond to entitlement realloca-
tions by adjusting their levels of spending, what would that mean for
the distribution of income and wealth across individuals? This is a
maddeningly complex question with no easy answer. Would the fed-
eral government spend more on national defense if not for Printz?
And if so, who benefits from defense spending? (The answer to the
latter question depends—to be rather glib—on whether potential
invaders would want to enslave us or just to plunder the assets of the
wealthy.) Insofar as federalism doctrines make the states richer, do
145 The data for Figure 6 are drawn from OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 2018: HISTORICAL
TABLES (Table 3.2—Outlays by Function and Subfunction: 1962–2022), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/hist.pdf, and from
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING
FISCAL 2014–2016 STATE SPENDING 10–11 tbl. 3 (2016).
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the states spend more money on schools? And if so, who benefits from
that?146
One common approach is to treat all spending as lump-sum redis-
tribution allocated on a per-capita basis;147 on this view, shifts from
federal to state spending would have no effect on interpersonal distri-
bution beyond the effects from corresponding tax-burden shifts. An
alternative approach would be to try to determine who benefits from
federal spending and who benefits from state spending; and yet such
an exercise—fraught in its own right—tells us very little about who
benefits from the marginal dollar of federal/state spending.148 I will
not seek to resolve that question here, except to note that spending-
side changes potentially magnify and potentially moderate the redis-
tributive effects of federalism doctrines. If the marginal $1 of state
spending is more likely than the marginal $1 of federal spending to
flow to the Rest rather than the Rich, then spending-side adjustments
magnify the distributional consequences of state-to-federal tax burden
shifts. If the opposite, then spending-side adjustments offset some of
the distributional effects of federalism-induced tax changes.
C. Effects on the Overall Size of Government
So far, the analysis in this Article has proceeded on the assump-
tion that bargaining between Congress and the states is Coasean (i.e.,
that transaction costs are zero). That assumption is obviously
counterfactual (or, at the very least, implausible).149 Insofar as the
transfer of entitlements requires legislation at either level, drafting
costs and logrolling may get in the way of mutually beneficial
exchanges. And even if state and federal agencies can negotiate the
necessary transfer, such exchanges will inevitably involve transaction
146 Edward Wolff finds that education spending benefits lower-income households much
more—in percentage-of-income terms—than higher-income households. See Edward N.
Wolff & Ajit Zacharias, The Distributional Consequences of Government Spending and
Taxation in the U.S., 1989 and 2000, 53 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 692, 704, 711 (2007).
147 See, e.g., Allan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the Size of
Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914, 917 (1981); Jason S. Oh, Are Progressive Tax Rates
Progressive Policy?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1909, 1975 (2017) (noting that “[t]he optimal tax
literature suggests that rates should generally be flatter and that redistribution is optimally
pursued through significant lump-sum payments”).
148 See, e.g., Gerald Prante & Andrew Chamberlain, Who Pays Taxes and Who Receives
Government Spending? An Analysis of Federal, State and Local Tax and Spending
Distributions, 1991-2004, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://tax.network/gprante/who-
pays-taxes-and-who-receives-government-spending-an-analysis-of-federal-state-and-local-
tax-and-spending-distributions-1991-2004 (noting that “one dollar of taxes will be valued
more highly by some households than others”).
149 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inverted Theories 1 (Aug. 11, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017437 (“The  zero transaction cost
assumption is, of course, wildly unrealistic—a fact Coase emphasized from the outset.”).
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costs as well: No complex organization operates friction-free, and cer-
tainly not a state or federal bureaucracy.
Transaction costs may alter the analysis above in two ways. First,
in a world with positive transaction costs, federalism doctrines that
allocate valuable entitlements to the states rather than the federal
government may discourage Congress from pursuing new programs.
Imagine, as above, that the states can implement Medicaid at a cost of
$10, but now add three more elements to the hypothetical: (1) mem-
bers of Congress assign a value of $11 to the Medicaid program; (2) it
would cost $12 for the federal government to implement the program
on its own; and (3) Congress and the states will incur transaction costs
of $2 if Congress tries to purchase the states’ services. These transac-
tion costs may take a number of forms, including—as in the case of
the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion—political costs and/or
personal disutility incurred by governors who simply do not want to
strike a deal with an administration they oppose.150
Under these assumptions, the program will be implemented if
commandeering is allowed but not if Printz is the law of the land. If
Congress can compel the states to administer the program, Congress
will do so—and the states will not “counter-commandeer” by paying
the federal government to lay off (costs to the states of $10 < benefit
to Congress of $11). But if $2 of costs are incurred in the transactional
process, then no deal will occur (costs to the states $10 + transaction
costs of $2 > benefit to Congress of $11). And Congress will not
implement the program through the federal bureaucracy because the
cost of doing so is higher than the benefit that members perceive ($12
cost of federal implementation > benefit to Congress of $11).
We therefore might expect federalism doctrines to affect which
programs get implemented as well as who pays. These doctrines could
deter Congress from implementing new federal-state programs or
expanding existing ones in the presence of transaction costs. But we
might also imagine federalism doctrines affecting the size of govern-
ment in the opposite direction—assuming, again, positive transaction
costs. Put yourself in the position of a governor or state lawmaker in a
world in which New York, Printz, Seminole Tribe, and Alden all went
the other way. You are deciding whether to invest resources in
building up a state bureaucracy. You know, however, that at any point
Congress can swoop in and either commandeer your bureaucracy for
its own ends or subject you to liability with respect to your activities.
150 See Kimberly Leonard, Opposing Medicaid Expansion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Dec. 4, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/12/04/
opposing-medicaid-expansion (discussing opposition to Medicaid expansion among
Republican governors and state lawmakers).
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Might this knowledge influence your decision whether or not to
proceed?
This latter argument aligns with the conventional economic
wisdom supporting the just compensation requirement for govern-
ment takings of private property. The intuition there is that if individ-
uals and firms fear the government seizing their property without
compensation at any moment, they will refrain from investing capital
in productive enterprises.151 The just compensation requirement
serves to encourage individuals and firms to make capital outlays not-
withstanding the risk of a taking. So too, the anti-commandeering and
state sovereign immunity doctrines encourage states to invest in their
own governments.152
The analogy is admittedly imperfect. An entitlement is protected
by a “liability rule” when “someone may destroy the initial entitle-
ment if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it,”
even if the original entitlement holder refuses to sell for that price.153
An entitlement is protected by a “property rule” when “someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him
in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller.”154 The just compensation requirement
151 For an overview and analysis of the law and economics literature on just
compensation, see William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988).
152 For this reason, Congress might have an incentive to pre-commit to an anti-
commandeering rule even if the Court did not force it to. The logic for doing so would be
the same logic that would lead a government to bind itself to a just compensation
requirement in the takings context: Given a choice between (a) being able to commandeer
state administrative capabilities and (b) having to pay for the states’ services, Congress
would prefer (a). But given a choice between (b) having to pay for the states’ services and
(c) not being able to procure state services at any price, Congress would choose (b). If
commandeering is unfettered, then states will be reluctant to build up their own
administrative capabilities, leaving Congress in the land of option (c). And so Congress is
better off if it can credibly commit not to commandeer the states.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, might
be interpreted as a pre-commitment mechanism of this sort. Under the 1995 Act, House
and Senate members may raise a point of order against a direct mandate in legislation that
imposes a cost exceeding $50 million on state or local governments. See ROBERT JAY
DILGER & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40957 UNFUNDED MANDATES
REFORM ACT: HISTORY, IMPACT, AND ISSUES 3–4 (2013). But points of order under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act can be waived by majority vote, and the Act does not
apply to potentially coercive conditions in grant-in-aid programs. See id. at 9, 18. The Act
has thus proven not to be a self-imposed straitjacket, but instead a relatively loose
constraint on Congress’s ability to externalize costs downward to states and localities. See
Theresa Gullo, History and Evaluation of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 57 NAT’L
TAX J. 559, 568 (2004).
153 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092.
154 Id.
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operates as a liability rule. By contrast, the anti-commandeering and
state sovereign immunity doctrines operate as property rules.155
One can imagine a liability rule in this context taking the fol-
lowing form: States have an entitlement to their own legislative and
executive processes, and to immunity from suit by private citizens in
state and federal court. Congress cannot take that entitlement away
from states without paying. But Congress can exercise a power of emi-
nent domain over the states and seize the relevant entitlement for
itself, provided that it pays just compensation. And if state and federal
officials cannot settle the matter themselves, courts will adjudicate the
question of how much compensation is just.156 On this view, the fed-
eral government could have required states to expand Medicaid to all
citizens with incomes up to 133% of the poverty line, and could have
required states to establish health insurance exchanges under the
Affordable Care Act. If a state failed to reach an agreement with the
federal government regarding funding, then the state would have the
right to sue the federal government for just compensation. A court
(presumably a federal court) would then determine how much the
federal government must transfer to the state in order to compensate
the state fully for the cost of administering the relevant program. The
court’s role would be much the same as the Court of Federal Claims in
the federal eminent domain context.157
Something like this was suggested by Justice Souter in his dissent
in Printz.158 Justice Scalia responded wryly that Justice Souter’s sug-
gestion “would create a constitutional jurisprudence (for determining
when the compensation was adequate) that would make takings
cases appear clear and simple.”159 Justice Scalia’s response carries
155 The anti-coercion doctrine arguably operates as an inalienability rule layered on top
of the property rules established by the anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity
doctrines. I say “arguably” because insofar as the anti-coercion doctrine serves as a public
law analogue to the private law doctrines of duress and unconscionability, then one might
describe the anti-coercion doctrine as defining consent rather than prohibiting exchanges
for which there is mutual consent. On the relationship between the unconscionability
doctrine and the Calabresi-Melamed framework, see generally Richard Craswell, Property
Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1993). Cf. Berman, supra note 20, at 1298–99 (discussing differences between NFIB’s anti-
coercion holding and the contract law doctrines of duress and unconscionability).
156 See Hills, supra note 75, at 823 (considering such a regime).
157 See Arbelaez v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 753, 761 (2010) (“The Court of Federal
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over takings claims against the United States in excess of
$10,000.”).
158 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 975–76 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that Congress cannot “require administrative support without an obligation to
pay fair value for it”).
159 Id. at 914 n.7.
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considerable force.160 To illustrate the difficulty of the valuation exer-
cise, imagine that the federal government commandeers state officials
to implement a controversial deportation policy. Should the states be
compensated only for the administrative costs of implementing the
deportation policy, or should states in which the overwhelming
majority of voters oppose the federal government’s deportation policy
also be compensated for the disutility of having their own state admin-
istrative resources used in the service of a policy they deplore? If the
former, then the risk that state administrative resources will be com-
mandeered to implement a policy that the state’s voters oppose may
operate as a disincentive against the state building up its own adminis-
trative capacity. If the latter, the valuation exercise becomes
unmoored from any dollar figure that is ascertainable in the real
world.
One can also imagine a counterfactual in which the relevant enti-
tlements allocated to states might be protected by an inalienability
rule161: States would not be able to sell their services to the federal
government, nor would they be allowed to waive their sovereign
immunity in exchange for federal cash. That is, states would not be
able to alienate their entitlements to their own administrative
resources and their sovereign immunity. Ilya Somin has argued in this
vein for a “categorical ban” on federal-to-state transfers, which would
160 See  Hills, supra note 75, at 935–36 (“Souter is wrong. Justice Scalia is perfectly
correct to note that such a rule would be completely impractical . . . .”).
161 Erin Ryan has suggested that New York v. United States in fact established an
inalienability rule. Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3
(2010). She notes that public officials representing New York supported the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the statute that supposedly
commandeered the state. See id. at 36 n.142. And she draws attention to an enigmatic line
in Justice O’Connor’s opinion: “Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the
‘consent’ of state officials.” Id. at 40 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182
(1992)).
Yet whatever Justice O’Connor might have meant, it is clear that state officials can
consent to exchanges with Congress in which the states agree to administer federal
programs. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (“We
have long recognized that Congress may use  power to grant federal funds to the States,
and may condition such a grant upon the States’ taking certain actions that Congress could
not require them to take.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Printz, 521 U.S. at 936
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that state officials “may voluntarily continue to
participate in the federal  program,” and that “Congress is also free to amend the interim
program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as
it does with a number of other federal programs”). The fact that state officials consent to
compliance with a congressional mandate certainly can serve as “ratifi[cation],”
notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s suggestion to the contrary in New York. 505 U.S. at
182.
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effectively shut down the now-vibrant intergovernmental market.162 A
consequence of such a ban would be to preclude Congress from
enlisting the states to carry out federal programs even when states are
the least-cost administrators. While in some cases the federal govern-
ment might implement the program on its own, in other cases the cost
to the federal government of acquiring the administrative capacity
necessary to implement the program might well prove prohibitive.
The analysis here of liability and inalienability alternatives is nec-
essarily speculative and concededly cursory. The conclusions can be
summarized as follows: First, just as the allocation of entitlements to
private property owners in the eminent domain context might
encourage private-sector investment, the rule in New York, Printz,
Seminole Tribe, and Alden plausibly encourages investment by states
in their own administrative capacity. Second, switching from a prop-
erty rule to a liability rule might make it easier for Congress to take
advantage of state administrative capabilities, and would reduce the
risk of transaction costs getting in the way. On the other hand, the
uncertainty of valuation under a liability rule might discourage states
from building up administrative capabilities in the first place. Third,
moving in the opposite direction from a property rule to an inaliena-
bility rule would raise the cost of new federal programs, because it
would preclude Congress from enlisting the states when the states are
the least-cost administrators. All in all, the allocation of the relevant
entitlements and the decision to protect those entitlements with a
property rule rather than a liability rule have ambiguous conse-
quences for the combined size of federal and state governments, while
an inalienability rule would unambiguously reduce the combined size
of federal and state governments.
D. Borrowing by Federal and State Governments
So far the analysis in this Article has assumed that if a new cost is
imposed on the federal government or on the states, the bearer of the
cost must respond by either (a) raising taxes or (b) cutting spending.
But there is of course a third option: borrowing. Or, more precisely,
borrowing is a live option for the federal government; the states, by
contrast, labor under balanced budget requirements that severely con-
strain their ability to borrow in response to a negative revenue
shock.163 And while states potentially can export costs to future
162 Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 495 (2002).
163 See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility
Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 755 (2010) (“Forty-nine of the U.S. states have some form
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taxpayers by failing to fund public employee pensions and retiree
health care, their ability to respond to revenue shortfalls by issuing
bonds is limited by anti-debt norms and by capital markets.164
Congress faces much looser restrictions on borrowing and so has
much more leeway to shift costs to future taxpayers.165 To a first
approximation, we might expect to see Congress borrowing up to the
point that the marginal political cost of an additional $1 of debt equals
the marginal political cost of an additional $1 of taxes. If marginal
costs of debt and taxation were unequal, then members of Congress
could capture political gains by borrowing more or borrowing less. We
might likewise expect that when additional fiscal burdens are shifted
to the federal government, Congress will allocate some of those bur-
dens to future taxpayers and some to taxpayers in the present period.
In other words, we might expect that federalism doctrines allocating
valuable entitlements to the states induce the federal government to
borrow somewhat more than it otherwise would.
What are the distributional consequences of federal borrowing?
The answer turns on several factors. First, we might expect that higher
public debt levels will lead to higher inflation,166 which in turn will
lead to redistribution from net creditor households (who tend to be
wealthier) toward net borrowers (who tend to be poorer).167 Second,
the distributional consequences of deficit spending depend in part on
whether future governments finance interest and principal payments
through spending cuts or tax hikes. Insofar as debt today leads to
spending cuts tomorrow, then the burden of borrowing falls on the
beneficiaries of future government spending. Insofar as debt today
leads to higher taxes tomorrow, then the burden of borrowing falls to
tomorrow’s taxpayers. If tomorrow’s federal tax system looks like
today’s, then the brunt of that cost is borne by higher-income earners.
Alternatively, if today’s rich reduce their consumption and increase
their bequests to their children (presumably tomorrow’s rich) in order
of balanced-budget requirements. And even the one state that does not—Vermont—has
generally acted as though so bound.” (footnote omitted)).
164 See id. at 764–65 (explaining that states may fear the power of capital markets and be
constrained by norms against running deficits).
165 On the efficacy of federal balanced budget rules, see generally Alan J. Auerbach,
Federal Budget Rules: The US Experience (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 1422, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14288.
166 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff find that the United States is unusual among
advanced economies in that it indeed exhibits a debt-inflation link. See Carmen M.
Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 573, 573
(2010).
167 See, e.g., Edward N. Wolff, The Distributional Effects of the 1969–75 Inflation on
Holdings of Household Wealth in the United States, 25 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 195,
206–07 (1979).
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to offset their children’s future tax liabilities, then the burden of bor-
rowing falls on more or less the same people who bear the brunt of
present-period taxation.
Adding dimensions of intergenerational equity to the mix compli-
cates the analysis considerably. If future generations are better off
than the current generation, might we want to redistribute from
tomorrow to today? Michael Doran and Daniel Shaviro have consid-
ered this question at length and in depth, and I will not reproduce
their thoughtful analyses here.168 The important point for present pur-
poses is that the allocation of entitlements across levels of government
may affect the allocation of fiscal burdens across generations because
the federal government is more prone to (and capable of) borrowing
than the states.
E. Federalist Safeguards of Progressivity and Political Safeguards
of Federalism
So far this Article has operated under the assumption that the
judicial allocation of entitlements across levels of government actually
matters to the intergovernmental distribution of wealth. Some
scholars of federalism might dispute that assumption on the ground
that ultimately, it’s politics up and down. The most famous articula-
tion of this viewpoint is Herbert Wechsler’s 1954 article “The Political
Safeguards of Federalism,” in which Wechsler argues that states have
wholly adequate mechanisms for defending their own interests
without judicial intervention. In Wechsler’s view, Senators defend the
interests of their states, state legislatures influence their House dele-
gations by drawing districts and controlling voter qualifications, and
the Electoral College requires presidential candidates to be respon-
sive to state interests.169 Judicial doctrines do not protect state entitle-
ments because political processes already accomplish that same
end.170
In a more recent updating of Wechsler’s thesis, Larry Kramer
argues that party politics play the safeguarding role that Wechsler
attributes to the formal institutions. Kramer posits that federal and
state elected officials are mutually dependent on “decentralized”
168 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER? (2014); Michael Doran,
Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61 TAX L. REV. 241 (2008); Daniel
Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main Problem Generational Inequity?, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1298 (2009).
169 See Wechsler, supra note 23, at 546–57.
170 See id. at 558–60 (concluding that, because our system of government “is intrinsically
well adapted to retar[d] or restrain[] new intrusions by the center on the domain of the
states” the Supreme Court need only have a minimal role in checking the federal
government).
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political parties that serve to link their electoral fortunes and thus
align their interests. Kramer’s theory would suggest that members of
Congress do not look to export fiscal burdens to the states where pos-
sible, because members of Congress and state lawmakers are on the
same team (or the same two teams, Team Red and Team Blue).171
On this view, federal grants to state and local governments are
not payments to states for services rendered or for relinquishment of
sovereign immunity. The strings attached to federal grants are in fact
ribbons wrapped around gratuitous transfers. The federal government
has an advantage vis-a`-vis the states when it comes to revenue raising,
and federal elected officials generously use the federal tax system to
muster funds for their own projects as well as their state-level team-
mates. Litigation is an aberration. Cases like New York, Printz,
Seminole Tribe, and Alden are exceptions, and federal-state amity is
the norm.
The idea of parties as the power centers of American politics may
have taken a beating in the 2016 election, in which a candidate
entirely independent from his political party ascended to the nomina-
tion and then the White House.172 And the idea that members of Con-
gress are looking out for their co-partisans in the state houses stands
at odds with models of political behavior that emphasize reelection or
rent extraction as a lawmaker’s maximand.173 Moreover, party politics
can have cross-cutting consequences for federal-state relations. On the
one hand, partisan considerations may make federal officials more
willing to bear revenue raising responsibilities themselves and to share
that revenue with their co-partisans at the state level. On the other
hand, partisan considerations may serve to exacerbate federal-state
tensions when federal and state governments are controlled by dif-
ferent parties. The conflict between Republican governors and the
Obama Administration regarding Medicaid expansion under the
Affordable Care Act serves as a case in point,174 as does the conflict
171 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278–85 (2000).
172 On the implications of the 2016 election for party-centric theories of American
politics, see Danielle Kurtzleben, Celebrities, Lies and Outsiders: How This Election
Surprised One Political Scientist, NPR (June 21, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/
06/21/482357936/celebrities-lies-and-outsiders-how-this-election-surprised-one-political-
scienti.
173 See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 6 (1974)
(viewing members of Congress as primarily focused on reelection); Fred S. McChesney,
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 101, 102 (1987) (viewing politicians as primarily focused on rent extraction).
174 See Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion, THE ADVISORY BD. CO. (May
19, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/
medicaidmap (providing an overview of the status of Medicaid expansion in each state).
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between Democratic mayors and the Trump Administration regarding
the participation of local law enforcement officials in deportation
efforts.175
My goal here is not to adjudicate the debate between scholars
such as Kramer, who view federal-state relations as fundamentally
cooperative, and others who see federal-state interactions as competi-
tive to the core.176 My objective is to explain how the intergovern-
mental distribution of wealth can affect the interpersonal distribution
of wealth. If one believes that federal-to-state transfers spring from
political rather than judicial origins, then it is the political safeguards
of federalism that serve as safeguards of progressive taxation.
Whether rooted in doctrine or in norms, however, the allocation of
revenue raising responsibilities to the federal government rather than
the states still has a significant effect on the interpersonal allocation of
resources.
CONCLUSION
The central argument of this Article is that federalism doctrines
that allocate valuable entitlements to the states rather than the federal
government can generate interpersonal as well as intergovernmental
effects. Specifically, the allocation of valuable entitlements to states
rather than to the federal government pushes more revenue raising
toward the federal tax system rather than state tax systems. Since the
federal tax system is quite a bit more progressive than even the most
progressive state tax systems, the likely net result of these entitlement
allocations is to shift resources in a progressive direction.
The magnitude of the shift described above is difficult to esti-
mate. If the $686.3 billion raised by the federal government and trans-
ferred to the states in fiscal year 2017 had been raised through the
state systems instead, then—holding the progressivity of the federal
and state systems constant, and relying on the figures in Table 1—we
would expect the after-tax income of the top 1% to rise by 2.0% of
175 See Alejandro Lazo & Shibani Mahtani, Sanctuary City Mayors Vow to Protect
Immigrants, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctuary-city-
mayors-vow-to-protect-immigrants-1490665641 (reporting reactions from Democratic
mayors to Trump administration’s “sanctuary cities” policy).
176 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 972 (2001) (conceding that the political process
“afford[s] some protections for state automony,” but still concluding “judicial review of
federalism issues is necessary both to remind Congress of its own obligation to restrain
itself, and to catch any particularly egregious examples of federal overreaching” (footnote
omitted)); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence
recognizes an inevitable conflict of interest between federal and state officials).
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cash income, and the after-tax income of the bottom quintile to fall by
4.2% of cash income.177 These effects are not insignificant by any
measure. But they should not be treated as lower or upper bounds.
These projections may be too high if (as contemplated in Part IV.A)
more state-level revenue raising resulted in more progressive state tax
structures. Conversely, these estimates may be too low if Congress—
in the absence of an anti-commandeering doctrine—shifted responsi-
bility for what are currently federal programs to the states. That is, the
sum of federal-to-state transfers under the status quo is not necessa-
rily a cap on the intergovernmental wealth effect of federalism doc-
trines, because there may be programs that the federal government
administers itself today but that it would foist upon the states if it
could.
While caution should be exercised in deriving dollar figures from
the analysis above, caution should also be exercised in drawing doc-
trinal conclusions. Distribution is not the only consideration relevant
to constitutional law. Conservatives who support federalism doctrines
but also favor flatter tax rates should not necessarily reconsider their
embrace of the former. Views regarding federalism doctrines will in
most cases be motivated by non-distributional arguments that this
Article does not question. The analysis here focuses on the conse-
quences of—and not the justifications for—federalism’s allocation of
entitlements to the states.
If there is an insight that progressives and conservatives alike can
draw from the analysis in this Article, it is—I hope—the following:
The distribution of wealth across levels of government is inextricably
intertwined with questions of interpersonal distribution. Accordingly,
understanding the structure of inequality in the United States requires
an understanding of our fiscal constitution. The relationship between
federalism doctrines and wealth inequality is complex, but one conclu-
sion seems to emerge clearly: The allocation of rights and responsibili-
ties across levels of government has the potential to shape the
allocation of resources across individuals, across households, and
across generations.
177 See supra Table 1 and notes 37–38.
